## Facts

- A captive-born bottlenose dolphin, Kama, was transferred from the New England Aquarium to the U.S. Navy for research after the dolphin did not integrate well with other aquarium dolphins.
- The Aquarium sought federal authorization for the transfer under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).
- Federal agencies authorized the transfer through a “Letter of Agreement” rather than issuing a formal MMPA permit with notice-and-hearing procedures.
- Kama and several animal-protection organizations sued the Aquarium, the Navy, and federal agencies, alleging the transfer required an MMPA permit and that the Letter of Agreement unlawfully avoided statutory public-participation procedures.
- Defendants moved to dismiss and for summary judgment, including on standing; plaintiffs moved to amend to add claims concerning another dolphin and sought dismissal of state-law counterclaims.

## Issues

1. Whether the MMPA authorizes a marine mammal (Kama) to sue as a plaintiff to challenge its transfer.
2. Whether the organizational plaintiffs (or their members) had Article III standing based on aesthetic, observational, informational, or procedural harms tied to the transfer and the use of Letters of Agreement.
3. Whether leave to amend should be granted after summary-judgment motions, and how to dispose of state-law counterclaims once federal claims are dismissed.

## Decision

- The court granted summary judgment for defendants on the federal claims for lack of standing.
- The court held the MMPA does not authorize animals to sue; its citizen-suit provision applies to “persons,” and the court required a clear statutory statement to extend standing to a marine mammal.
- The court held the organizations and their members failed to show a concrete, particularized injury in fact; generalized interest in marine mammals and asserted loss of participation in permitting procedures were insufficient without a specific personal stake.
- The court denied plaintiffs’ motion to amend to add new claims regarding another dolphin, citing timing and expansion of a case already deficient on standing.
- The court dismissed defendants’ state-law counterclaims without prejudice after dismissing the federal claims.

## Legal Principles

- Statutory standing depends on whether the statute authorizes the plaintiff’s suit; absent a clear statement, animals are not treated as “persons” entitled to sue under the MMPA.
- Article III standing requires injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, fairly traceable to the challenged action, and likely to be redressed by judicial relief.
- Aesthetic, observational, or ideological interests in animal welfare, without a concrete individualized connection to the challenged conduct, do not establish injury in fact.
- Alleged procedural or informational violations (such as lack of notice or a hearing) do not confer standing by themselves without a concrete interest affected by the allegedly unlawful procedure.
- Organizations asserting associational standing must identify at least one member who would have standing in an individual capacity.

## Conclusion

The court dismissed the MMPA challenge because Kama lacked statutory authority to sue and the organizational plaintiffs failed to show a concrete Article III injury from the transfer or from the government’s use of Letters of Agreement instead of formal permits, and it consequently denied amendment and dismissed state-law counterclaims without prejudice.


Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. New Eng. Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1993)