City and County of San Francisco v. State, 128 Cal. App. 4th 1030, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722 (2005)

Facts

  • On February 12, 2004, the City and County of San Francisco began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
  • Lawsuits were filed seeking to stop the City’s actions based on California statutes limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples, including Family Code § 308.5 (enacted after voter approval of Proposition 22).
  • The City filed its own action against the State seeking a declaration that the challenged statutes were unconstitutional; a related action by private plaintiffs (including Lancy Woo and others) challenged the same statutory scheme against the Attorney General. The matters were consolidated.
  • The Proposition 22 Legal Defense and Education Fund (Fund) was formed about one year after Proposition 22 passed. Its stated purpose was to ensure enforcement of the initiative.
  • The Fund’s board included individuals who had spent time and money supporting Proposition 22’s campaign; State Senator William Knight, a named proponent of Proposition 22, was also a board member before his death.
  • The Fund filed separate litigation challenging the City’s issuance of licenses and also moved to intervene in the consolidated constitutional challenges under Code of Civil Procedure § 387(a).
  • The trial court denied the Fund’s motions to intervene. The Fund appealed those denials to the California Court of Appeal.

Issues

  1. Under Code of Civil Procedure § 387(a), did the Fund have a sufficiently “direct and immediate” interest in the consolidated actions challenging Proposition 22 and related statutes to justify permissive intervention?
  2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying the Fund’s motions to intervene?

Decision

  • The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s orders denying the Fund permissive intervention.
  • The Fund did not show an interest “of such a direct and immediate character” that it would gain or lose by the direct legal operation of any judgment in the consolidated cases.
  • The Fund’s asserted interest—support for, and desire to defend, the challenged statutes—was a generalized interest in the subject matter of the litigation, not a specific legal stake.
  • The Fund identified no tangible harm that it or its members would suffer from an adverse judgment invalidating the statutes.
  • Given the absence of a direct and immediate interest, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying intervention.
  • Permissive intervention under Code of Civil Procedure § 387(a) requires a “direct and immediate” interest—one where the intervenor will gain or lose by the direct legal effect of the judgment.
  • A generalized political, ideological, or policy interest in the outcome of litigation is insufficient to support intervention.
  • An organization’s mission to defend a law, and its members’ prior campaign activity supporting that law, does not by itself create a legally sufficient interest for intervention.
  • Orders granting or denying permissive intervention are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal held that the Proposition 22 Legal Defense and Education Fund lacked the direct, immediate interest required for permissive intervention under Code of Civil Procedure § 387(a), and it therefore affirmed the trial court’s denial of the Fund’s motions to intervene in consolidated actions challenging Proposition 22 and related marriage statutes.