## Facts

- Columbia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (COA) long operated in Columbia, South Carolina’s billboard market and by 1981 controlled over 95% of the relevant market.
- Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (Omni), an out-of-state competitor, entered the Columbia market in 1981.
- COA expanded and modernized its billboard inventory and allegedly engaged in private anticompetitive acts (e.g., predatory pricing, false rumors, and inducing contract breaches).
- COA also urged city officials to adopt billboard restrictions; public support for regulation also came from citizens concerned about billboard growth.
- In 1982, the city enacted ordinances tightening billboard controls, including requiring council approval for new downtown billboards and later adopting comprehensive zoning limits on billboard location, size, and distribution.
- Omni alleged the ordinances resulted from a secret agreement between the city and COA to protect COA’s monopoly in exchange for political benefits to officials.

## Issues

1. Whether Columbia’s billboard zoning ordinances were immune from Sherman Act liability under the state-action (Parker) doctrine when enacted under delegated state zoning authority.
2. Whether a municipality loses Parker immunity when it allegedly conspires with a private party to enact anticompetitive regulation.
3. Whether COA’s efforts to influence the enactment of the zoning ordinances were shielded from antitrust liability under petitioning immunity (Noerr-Pennington) principles.
4. Whether COA could still face antitrust or state-law liability based solely on alleged private anticompetitive conduct apart from the ordinances and petitioning.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held the city’s billboard regulation was immune under Parker because state zoning statutes authorized the city to regulate billboards and anticompetitive effects were a foreseeable result of zoning.
- The Court rejected any “conspiracy” exception to Parker immunity based on alleged collusion between a municipality and a private beneficiary.
- The Court held COA’s lobbying and related efforts to secure the ordinances were generally protected from antitrust liability under Noerr-Pennington-type petitioning immunity, absent narrow exceptions not established on the record.
- The Court remanded for consideration whether the verdict could be sustained based solely on COA’s alleged private conduct and whether COA could be liable under state law.
- Disposition: reversed and remanded.

## Legal Principles

- State-action (Parker) immunity bars Sherman Act liability for anticompetitive restraints imposed by government as an act of government; municipalities receive immunity when acting pursuant to clearly delegated state authority, and suppression of competition may be inferred when it is a foreseeable result of authorized regulation.
- There is no free-standing antitrust “conspiracy,” “corruption,” or “public interest” exception that strips Parker immunity from municipal regulation enacted within delegated authority.
- Petitioning government for legislation or regulation is generally immune from antitrust liability even when intended to secure anticompetitive outcomes; the mere fact that regulation benefits the petitioner does not create antitrust liability absent limited exceptions (e.g., sham petitioning).
- Immunity for governmental action and protected petitioning does not automatically immunize separate private conduct; private acts may still support antitrust liability if independently unlawful.

## Conclusion

The Court held that Columbia’s billboard zoning restrictions were immune from federal antitrust liability under Parker despite allegations of collusive, self-serving regulation, and that COA’s efforts to obtain the ordinances were generally protected petitioning activity; the case was remanded to assess liability based solely on COA’s alleged private anticompetitive conduct and any state-law claims.


City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991)