## Facts

- A community organization obtained permission to fly a rainbow flag on the Ohio Statehouse grounds for a pride celebration.
- Charles S. Spingola went to the Statehouse on June 27, 1999, protested, climbed the flagpole, and cut down the flag.
- Columbus charged Spingola with ethnic intimidation (with criminal damaging as the predicate offense) and criminal damaging under a city ordinance.
- At trial, evidence showed Spingola knew in advance the flag would be displayed and did not pursue lawful alternatives to object or seek its removal.
- Spingola testified he believed homosexuality was sinful and claimed his conduct was morally compelled.
- The trial court denied Spingola’s request for a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of necessity.
- The jury acquitted Spingola of ethnic intimidation but convicted him of criminal damaging as a lesser-included offense.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of necessity.
2. Whether Columbus lacked authority under Ohio’s Home Rule Amendment to apply its criminal-damaging ordinance to conduct on state-owned Statehouse grounds.

## Decision

- The court of appeals affirmed the criminal-damaging conviction.
- The trial court properly refused the requested necessity instruction because it did not correctly state Ohio law and the evidence did not support necessity.
- Columbus could enforce its criminal-damaging ordinance on state-owned property within city limits where enforcement did not regulate state governmental functions and did not conflict with general state law.

## Legal Principles

- A defendant is entitled to an affirmative-defense instruction only if (1) the proposed instruction correctly states the law and (2) sufficient evidence, if believed, could permit reasonable jurors to find the defense applies.
- Necessity in Ohio is narrow and requires an imminent harm, a direct causal connection between the act and avoiding that harm, and the absence of reasonable legal alternatives.
- A municipality may enforce neutral criminal ordinances within its territorial limits on state-owned land, unless the ordinance conflicts with general laws or impermissibly regulates state operations as sovereign.
- State ownership of land, without more, does not bar municipal enforcement of criminal ordinances against private individuals acting on that land.

## Conclusion

The appellate court upheld Spingola’s conviction for criminal damaging because the record did not warrant a necessity instruction and the City of Columbus had home-rule authority to apply its criminal ordinance to conduct occurring on the Statehouse grounds without conflicting with state law or regulating state governmental functions.


City of Columbus v. Spingola, 144 Ohio App. 3d 76 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 2001)