## Facts

- Texas enacted Senate Bill 4 (SB 4) to restrict “sanctuary city” policies and increase local cooperation with federal immigration enforcement.
- SB 4 barred local entities and their officers/employees from adopting, enforcing, or endorsing policies that “prohibit or materially limit” immigration-law enforcement.
- SB 4 required honoring certain ICE detainer requests, permitting continued detention for transfer to federal custody for a limited time.
- SB 4 authorized (and in some circumstances required) local officers, during lawful detentions, to inquire into immigration status and to share information with federal authorities.
- SB 4 imposed civil fines for violations, and authorized removal of certain officials from office.
- Multiple Texas cities/counties, officials, and organizations brought a pre-enforcement suit seeking to block SB 4 on constitutional grounds.
- The district court granted a preliminary injunction against several SB 4 provisions; Texas appealed and plaintiffs cross-appealed seeking broader relief.

## Issues

1. Whether SB 4’s cooperation, inquiry, information-sharing, and detainer provisions were preempted by federal immigration law.
2. Whether SB 4’s ICE detainer mandate was facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
3. Whether the phrase “materially limits” was unconstitutionally vague under due process principles.
4. Whether SB 4’s prohibition on “endorsing” certain policies violated the First Amendment, particularly as applied to elected officials.
5. Whether SB 4 violated anti-commandeering principles by requiring local participation in immigration enforcement.

## Decision

- The Fifth Circuit largely vacated the preliminary injunction and upheld SB 4 against the facial challenges.
- The court held that SB 4’s core cooperation-related provisions were not preempted by federal law.
- The court held plaintiffs did not show the detainer mandate was unconstitutional in all (or nearly all) applications; any unlawful detentions were for as-applied litigation.
- The court rejected the vagueness challenge, concluding “materially limits” had a clear core meaning sufficient to provide notice and constrain enforcement discretion.
- The court rejected the anti-commandeering claim because SB 4 is state law directing local entities within Texas, not federal compulsion of states.
- The court affirmed injunctive relief only as to the “endorsement” ban insofar as it prohibited elected officials from endorsing policies that limit immigration-law enforcement.
- The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss claims corresponding to the vacated portions of the injunction.

## Legal Principles

- A state immigration-cooperation statute is not conflict-preempted where it parallels or fits within federal statutory schemes that allow or encourage state-local communication and cooperation with federal immigration enforcement.
- A facial Fourth Amendment challenge to a detention mandate fails absent a showing that the law authorizes unconstitutional seizures in all or nearly all relevant applications; case-specific detention defects are generally addressed through as-applied claims.
- Statutory language is not void for vagueness if it provides ordinary people fair notice of prohibited conduct and contains an intelligible core that limits arbitrary enforcement; “materially limits” can meet that standard.
- The First Amendment constrains a state from restricting elected officials’ core political speech; banning elected officials from “endorsing” certain policies can be enjoined as an unconstitutional speech restriction.
- Anti-commandeering doctrine limits federal direction of state governments and does not prevent a state from controlling its own subdivisions and officials through state law.

## Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit upheld Texas SB 4 almost entirely at the preliminary-injunction stage, rejecting facial preemption, Fourth Amendment, vagueness, and anti-commandeering challenges, while preserving injunctive relief only against applying SB 4’s “endorsement” restriction to elected officials’ speech.


City of El Cenizo, Tex. v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018)