## Facts

- An Oklahoma City police officer shot and killed Albert Tuttle outside a bar where a robbery had been reported.
- Tuttle’s widow filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the officer and the City, alleging constitutional violations.
- The jury was instructed that the City could be liable only if a municipal “policy” caused the deprivation, but it could infer such a policy from a single, unusually excessive use of force, attributing it to inadequate training or supervision amounting to deliberate indifference or gross negligence.
- The jury found for the officer but against the City and awarded substantial damages.
- The court of appeals affirmed on the theory that a single incident could suffice to establish municipal liability.

## Issues

1. Whether the respondent waived an argument that the City’s objection to the challenged jury instruction was insufficient under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 by raising it only in merits briefing and oral argument.
2. Whether a jury may infer an unconstitutional municipal policy (such as inadequate training or supervision) solely from a single, unusually excessive use of force by a nonpolicymaking officer and impose municipal liability under § 1983 on that basis.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the judgment.
- The Court held it was too late for respondent to challenge the specificity of the City’s Rule 51 objection when the point was not raised until merits briefing and oral argument; the Court treated the objection as preserved.
- A plurality concluded the jury instruction misstated the § 1983 municipal-liability standard by permitting a finding of policy based solely on a single incident without proof of action by a municipal policymaker or an established policy or custom.
- The case was reversed because the instruction allowed municipal liability to be imposed without the required link between the constitutional injury and an official municipal policy or custom.

## Legal Principles

- Municipalities are not liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory; liability attaches only when an official policy or custom is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.
- When the alleged “policy” (e.g., inadequate training or supervision) is not unconstitutional on its face, proof of a single unconstitutional act by a nonpolicymaking employee ordinarily does not establish an actionable municipal policy or custom.
- A jury may not be instructed to infer municipal policy and policymaker culpability from a single incident of excessive force without independent evidence tying the injury to municipal decisionmakers, a pattern, or an existing unconstitutional policy.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed because the jury instruction improperly allowed municipal liability under § 1983 to rest on a single episode of alleged excessive force, without proof that an official municipal policy or custom attributable to policymakers caused the constitutional injury.


City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985)