## Facts

- Francene Kokaska drove north on Scottsdale Road at about 35 m.p.h. after leaving a restaurant around 1:15 a.m.
- Officer Dwight J. Edwards, on late-shift patrol in a City of Scottsdale police car, pursued a speeding vehicle at an estimated 60–65 m.p.h.
- Edwards knew the patrol car’s brakes were defective (requiring near-floorboard depression and prone to fade/grab) and had reported the condition; he drove the car after being directed to do so.
- Testimony conflicted on whether Edwards used emergency lights and a siren during the pursuit; multiple witnesses reported not hearing a siren and seeing lights only at the last moment.
- Kokaska changed lanes, exposing a motor scooter stopped in the center northbound lane to make a left turn; other vehicles were nearby in southbound lanes.
- Edwards braked and swerved left across the centerline to avoid the scooter, sideswiped a southbound Mercedes, and then collided with the rear/side of Kokaska’s vehicle, injuring her.
- A jury returned a verdict for Kokaska; the trial court ordered a remittitur, reducing the award from $90,000 to $70,000.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court erred by refusing defendants’ requested jury instructions specifically addressing foreseeability as part of Officer Edwards’s negligence.
2. Whether the trial court’s respondeat superior instruction (and its placement in the charge) improperly stated or affected the City’s liability.
3. Whether the court committed reversible error by not giving a separate apportionment instruction distinguishing preexisting injuries from accident-related aggravation.
4. Whether permitting a near-trial amendment adding defective-brake allegations, and related discovery and evidentiary rulings, was an abuse of discretion or unfairly prejudicial.
5. Whether the City could be held liable where some conduct occurred outside municipal boundaries during the pursuit.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the judgment (as remitted) against both the City and Officer Edwards.
- The trial court properly refused special foreseeability instructions because the risk of harm to other motorists from a high-speed pursuit under the circumstances was foreseeable as a matter of law.
- The instructions, read as a whole, adequately covered negligence, proximate cause, and damages, and did not misstate respondeat superior or require reversal.
- The court found no reversible error in declining a stand-alone apportionment instruction where the jury was instructed to award damages only for injuries caused or aggravated by defendants’ conduct.
- Allowing the complaint amendment and managing related discovery/medical evidence issues were within the trial court’s discretion and did not prejudice defendants.
- The City’s potential liability was not defeated merely because the pursuit extended beyond city limits when the officer was acting in an official capacity.

## Legal Principles

- Foreseeability may be resolved by the court as part of the duty analysis when the risk of the type of injury is reasonably apparent; in that circumstance, a separate foreseeability instruction is unnecessary.
- When jury instructions as a whole correctly state negligence, causation, and damages, omission of an additional, more specific instruction is not reversible error.
- A municipality may be liable under respondeat superior for an on-duty officer’s negligent acts committed within the scope of employment, including during traffic enforcement pursuits.
- Damages instructions are sufficient if they limit recovery to harm caused by defendants’ negligence and allow recovery for aggravation of preexisting conditions without requiring exact segregation where the charge adequately guides the jury.
- Trial courts have discretion to permit amendments relating to the same occurrence and to manage discovery and medical-evidence issues absent unfair surprise or prejudice.

## Conclusion

The court upheld liability against the officer and the City arising from a high-speed pursuit and related vehicle-condition allegations, concluding that the collision risk was foreseeable as a matter of law and that the trial court’s instructions and discretionary rulings did not warrant reversal.


City of Scottsdale v. Kokaska, 495 P.2d 1327 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)