## Facts

- Elizabeth W. Clapp (wife) and Michael B. Clapp (husband) married in 1967.
- Husband began practicing law in 1969 and later became a law-firm partner.
- The couple had two children, born in 1970 and 1972.
- Wife stayed home full time with the children until 1975.
- Wife earned a master’s degree in education in 1977 and worked as a school guidance counselor (junior high starting in 1977; high school starting in 1981).
- The parties separated in June 1987; wife filed for divorce in 1989.
- In 1991, wife earned $45,237 pre-tax; husband earned $137,600 pre-tax.
- The family court’s final divorce order entered in February 1993; both parties were 48 years old.
- The family court found marital assets of $1,257,577 and liabilities of $498,773.
- The family court divided the marital estate 60% to wife and 40% to husband and ordered both residences sold with the equity divided 60/40.
- The family court ordered husband to pay maintenance of $2,000 per month and also directed a maintenance calculation based on equalizing the parties’ after-tax income from June 1987 through the divorce date, with an annual inflation adjustment.
- To secure maintenance if husband died before age 65, the family court ordered husband either to pledge his interest in his law firm or to purchase a life-insurance policy in an equivalent amount.
- Husband appealed, challenging the property distribution, the maintenance award, the order to sell his residence, and the security requirement.

## Issues

1. Whether the family court erred in finding wife eligible for maintenance under 15 V.S.A. § 752(a), given her income and the property awarded to her.
2. Whether the family court abused its discretion in awarding permanent maintenance of $2,000 per month and in using an after-tax income equalization approach (with inflation adjustments) as part of its maintenance calculation.
3. Whether the family court acted within its authority under 15 V.S.A. § 751 to order a 60/40 property division and to order the sale of the parties’ residences as part of the distribution.
4. Whether the family court exceeded its authority by requiring husband to pledge his law-firm interest or purchase life insurance to secure maintenance in the event of his death before age 65.

## Decision

- The Vermont Supreme Court struck the paragraph requiring husband to pledge his law-firm interest or purchase life insurance to secure maintenance upon his death before age 65.
- The Court otherwise affirmed the final divorce order, including the 60/40 property division, the order to sell the residences, and the maintenance award.

## Legal Principles

- Divorce property division and maintenance awards are reviewed for abuse of discretion and clear error; trial courts have substantial discretion when applying 15 V.S.A. §§ 751–752 to the facts found.
- Under 15 V.S.A. § 752(a), “reasonable needs” is not limited to bare subsistence; the court may consider the marital standard of living, income disparity, and the equities of the parties’ roles during a long marriage.
- A spouse’s nonmonetary contributions as a homemaker and parent may support a maintenance award, including in cases where those contributions helped the other spouse obtain a greater future earning capacity.
- Vermont courts may structure property division to achieve an equitable result, including ordering the sale of marital real estate as part of distributing the marital estate under 15 V.S.A. § 751.
- Absent express statutory authority, Vermont law does not permit maintenance obligations that continue after the obligor’s death; security measures that effectively guarantee payments after death operate as unauthorized post-death maintenance (consistent with Justis v. Rist).

## Conclusion

Clapp v. Clapp upheld the family court’s 60/40 division of marital property, its authority to order sale of the residences, and its award of $2,000 per month maintenance based on the parties’ circumstances and the marriage’s standard of living, but the Vermont Supreme Court removed the requirement that the husband pledge his law-firm interest or buy equivalent life insurance because it would function as impermissible maintenance after the husband’s death without statutory authorization.


Clapp v. Clapp, 653 A.2d 72 (1994)