## Facts

- Two Cuban nationals, Sergio Suarez Martinez and Daniel Benitez, entered the United States in 1980 during the Mariel Boatlift and were allowed into the country on discretionary immigration parole.
- Both later incurred criminal convictions, were found inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182, were ordered removed, and were taken into immigration custody.
- Because Cuba would not accept their repatriation, their removal was not realistically foreseeable.
- After the 90-day statutory removal period in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), the government continued to detain them under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which states that certain noncitizens “may be detained beyond the removal period.”
- Each filed a habeas petition challenging continued detention when removal was not reasonably foreseeable.
- The Ninth Circuit ordered Martinez released under supervision; the Eleventh Circuit denied relief to Benitez, concluding inadmissible aliens could be detained indefinitely, creating a circuit split.

## Issues

1. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), as construed in Zadvydas to limit detention to the time reasonably necessary to effect removal with a six-month presumptive period, applies to inadmissible aliens ordered removed.
2. Whether the government may interpret the same operative detention language in § 1231(a)(6) to allow potentially indefinite detention for inadmissible aliens while limiting detention for admitted aliens.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court held that § 1231(a)(6) authorizes detention after the removal period only for a period reasonably necessary to accomplish removal.
- The Court applied the Zadvydas framework to inadmissible aliens: six months is presumptively reasonable; after that, continued detention is unauthorized if there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
- The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s grant of relief to Martinez and reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s denial of relief to Benitez.
- The Court rejected reliance on 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) as an independent basis for continued detention beyond the limits imposed by § 1231(a)(6) as construed.

## Legal Principles

- A single statutory phrase must generally be given a single meaning across the categories to which Congress applied it, absent a textual basis for different meanings.
- Under § 1231(a)(6), post-removal-order detention is limited to the time reasonably necessary to carry out removal; it does not authorize indefinite civil detention when removal is not reasonably foreseeable.
- Six months after the start of post-removal-period detention is presumptively reasonable; after six months, if the detainee shows good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the government must rebut that showing or release the person subject to supervision.
- The government cannot avoid the statutory limit by invoking parole-related provisions as a separate detention authorization.

## Conclusion

The Court interpreted § 1231(a)(6) to impose the same time-limited removal-focused detention authority for inadmissible aliens as for admitted aliens, requiring release under supervision when removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future after the presumptively reasonable six-month period.


Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005)