## Facts

- Rita A. Clark owned a painting she and her late husband received as a wedding gift in 1956.
- In 1968, the painting was examined through an opinion program at the National Gallery of Art; Clark later claimed she was told it could be worth up to $250,000. She kept the painting in storage for many years.
- In 1989, Clark arranged (through her brother, a friend of Catalina Meyer) to place the painting in Meyer’s East 67th Street townhouse so that a potential buyer might see it and purchase it.
- Clark contended she delivered the painting on the condition that Meyer would keep it insured for $200,000 for as long as it remained in Meyer’s possession.
- After receiving the painting, Meyer obtained insurance coverage, but the coverage later lapsed or expired.
- In 1997, a fire destroyed Meyer’s townhouse, killed Meyer, and destroyed the painting; no insurance coverage on the painting was in effect at the time of the fire.
- Clark sued Meyer’s estate, asserting contract and related theories to recover for the loss.
- During discovery, Clark deposed Meyer’s daughter, who served as executrix of the estate. The executrix testified that Meyer had said she believed the painting was a fake and not worth anything.
- Clark offered evidence including (i) a 1989 letter from Meyer stating the painting had been insured and that if anything happened the insurance company would pay Clark in full, and (ii) a handwritten note on Meyer’s insurance binder stating, “As per request by owner Rita Clark to be $200,000.”
- Clark moved for summary judgment; the estate cross-moved for partial summary judgment, seeking dismissal of two of the three counts and a ruling that any damages could not exceed $8,000.

## Issues

1. Whether, under Federal Rule of Evidence 601, New York’s Dead Man’s Statute (CPLR 4519) rendered Clark incompetent to testify about personal transactions and communications with the deceased Meyer, and therefore barred that testimony from consideration on summary judgment.
2. Whether the estate waived CPLR 4519’s protection (in whole or in part) through the executrix’s deposition testimony about Meyer’s statements concerning the painting’s authenticity and value.
3. Whether the remaining admissible evidence—particularly Meyer’s 1989 letter and the binder notation—entitled Clark to summary judgment on an agreement obligating Meyer to maintain $200,000 in insurance coverage.
4. Whether the estate was entitled to partial summary judgment dismissing noncontract counts and limiting damages as a matter of law (including the requested $8,000 cap).

## Decision

- The court denied Clark’s motion for summary judgment.
- The court granted in part and denied in part the estate’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment.
- The court held that CPLR 4519 applied (via Federal Rule of Evidence 601) and barred Clark, an interested witness, from offering testimony about her personal dealings and communications with Meyer to prove the alleged insurance undertaking against Meyer’s estate.
- The court rejected Clark’s waiver argument; the executrix’s testimony about Meyer’s view that the painting was worthless did not open the door to Clark’s barred testimony about the parties’ transactions and communications.
- The court treated the 1989 letter and the insurance-binder notation as potentially admissible, independent evidence attributable to Meyer that could support an inference of an understanding to insure the painting in the amount of $200,000.
- Even with those writings, the court found disputed factual questions concerning the existence, scope, and duration of any binding obligation to maintain insurance, making summary judgment for Clark inappropriate.
- The court dismissed two of Clark’s three pleaded counts on the estate’s cross-motion, leaving a narrower theory for trial tied to the alleged promise to insure and the documentary proof.
- The court declined to impose the estate’s requested $8,000 damages ceiling at the summary-judgment stage because damages depended on factual determinations, including what obligation (if any) was assumed and what loss was proved.

## Legal Principles

- In a federal civil action where state law supplies the rule of decision, Federal Rule of Evidence 601 incorporates state witness-competency rules; New York’s Dead Man’s Statute (CPLR 4519) can make an interested party incompetent to testify about personal transactions or communications with the decedent when offered against the decedent’s estate.
- On summary judgment, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that supporting materials set out facts that would be admissible at trial; evidence barred by CPLR 4519 therefore cannot be used to carry the movant’s burden on summary judgment.
- CPLR 4519 restricts certain oral testimony by an interested party but does not bar independent proof such as writings attributable to the decedent (for example, letters or handwritten notations) that bear on the alleged obligation.
- Waiver of the Dead Man’s Statute is limited; testimony by the estate’s representative about the decedent’s statements on related subjects does not automatically permit the adverse interested witness to testify to otherwise barred transactions and communications.
- Summary judgment is improper where admissible evidence permits competing inferences about contract formation, the scope and duration of a promised insurance obligation, and the amount of recoverable damages.

## Conclusion

Clark’s testimony about her alleged agreement with the deceased collector was excluded under New York’s Dead Man’s Statute as applied in federal court, which prevented Clark from winning summary judgment; however, the decedent’s 1989 letter and binder notation provided admissible evidence that could support a claim based on an insurance undertaking, so the court allowed a narrowed theory to proceed while granting the estate partial summary judgment dismissing two counts and refusing to cap damages at $8,000 as a matter of law.


Clark v. Meyer, 188 F. Supp. 2d 416 (2002)