## Facts

- In July 1983, Edward Charles Cleveland piloted a Piper Super Cub PA-18-150 at Mid-Valley Airport in Los Lunas, New Mexico, while towing a glider for commercial filming.
- To accommodate a camera, Cleveland and an FAA-certified mechanic removed the front pilot seat and installed a camera in that area; Cleveland flew from the rear seat.
- During takeoff, the plane struck a van parked on or near the runway, and Cleveland’s head hit the camera, causing severe brain injuries.
- Cleveland (through a conservator) sued the manufacturer under state products-liability theories, alleging negligent design based on inadequate forward visibility from the rear seat and the absence of a rear shoulder harness.
- A first jury trial produced a plaintiff verdict of about $2.5 million, but the court of appeals ordered a new trial because the verdict form improperly constrained allocation of fault among potentially responsible parties.
- On remand, the district court allowed the manufacturer to add a federal preemption defense, denied summary judgment on that defense, limited the second trial to liability only (excluding damages), and restricted proof to the witnesses and exhibits used in the first trial.
- The manufacturer pursued an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) from the pretrial orders on preemption and trial-scope/evidence limits.

## Issues

1. Whether the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and FAA regulations preempt state common-law products-liability claims challenging aircraft design safety.
2. Whether the district court erred by limiting the retrial to liability only, excluding damages, and restricting the parties to the witnesses and exhibits used in the first trial.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the denial of summary judgment on federal preemption, holding the state design-defect claims were not preempted.
- The court reversed the order limiting the retrial to liability and the categorical restriction on witnesses/exhibits.
- The case was remanded for further proceedings, including a broader retrial that could address damages and allow appropriate evidentiary flexibility.

## Legal Principles

- Federal aviation statutes and FAA regulations were treated as setting minimum safety standards; absent clear congressional intent, they do not displace state tort remedies for allegedly defective aircraft design.
- A statutory savings clause preserving other remedies weighs strongly against inferring either express or field preemption of state common-law claims.
- FAA certification and regulatory compliance do not, by themselves, create conflict preemption; state duties may impose additional requirements unless dual compliance is impossible.
- When a prior verdict is vacated due to faulty allocation of comparative responsibility, liability and damages may be sufficiently connected that limiting a new trial to liability can be an abuse of discretion.
- Trial-management orders in a retrial may not impose rigid evidentiary limits that risk manifest injustice; courts must allow enough flexibility to fairly litigate the issues reopened by the new trial.

## Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit held that federal aviation law did not preempt state-law aircraft design-defect claims and that, after reversal for improper fault allocation, the retrial could not be confined to liability with categorical limits on proof; the matter was remanded for a broader and fairer retrial process.


Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1993)