## Facts

- The United States hired Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. as prime contractor for a federal defense housing project in New Jersey.
- As required by the Miller Act, MacEvoy provided a payment bond to protect persons supplying labor and materials for the work.
- MacEvoy used subcontracts for parts of the project and obtained certain materials through a chain: a subcontractor purchased from an intermediate supplier (B), which had purchased from Calvin Tomkins Co. (A).
- Tomkins was a material supplier to an intermediate supplier, not in direct contract with the prime contractor or with an entity performing a defined portion of the prime contract.
- Tomkins sued on the Miller Act payment bond to recover unpaid sums.

## Issues

1. Whether an intermediate seller of materials qualifies as a “subcontractor” under the Miller Act so that a supplier to that seller has a right of action on the prime contractor’s payment bond.
2. Whether the Miller Act’s remedial purpose permits expanding bond coverage beyond the statute’s “direct contractual relationship with a subcontractor” limitation.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated dismissal of the action.
- A supplier who sells to a middleman that merely resells materials for the project may not recover on the Miller Act payment bond.
- The term “subcontractor” in the Miller Act does not include a materialman who merely sells materials to the contractor (or in the chain of resale).

## Legal Principles

- For Miller Act purposes, a “subcontractor” is an entity that undertakes performance of a specific part of the prime contract’s labor or material requirements, rather than a party that only supplies goods by sale.
- The Act authorizes suit by (1) those in direct contract with the prime contractor and (2) those in direct contract with a qualifying subcontractor; it does not extend to suppliers to materialmen.
- Courts may not extend Miller Act coverage to more remote claimants based solely on the statute’s protective policy where Congress imposed express limits on who may sue.

## Conclusion

The Court held that Miller Act payment-bond protection does not reach a supplier to a material supplier because “subcontractor” excludes those who merely sell materials, and the statute’s direct-relationship limitation controls despite the Act’s protective purpose.


Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Calvin Tomkins Co., 322 U.S. 102 (1944)