## Facts

- Pamela Clifton was an inmate at a Colorado women’s correctional facility and was approximately eight months pregnant.
- Four days before the incident, a prison physician informed her the pregnancy was progressing normally.
- On December 25, 1998, Clifton began experiencing contractions and reported she believed she was in labor.
- Clifton alleged Officer Dawn Anaya refused to send her to medical care during a head count and instead told her to use the bathroom; inmates allegedly could not access medical care without staff permission.
- Clifton later reported her labor symptoms to Officer Ira Wilks; she alleged he also failed to secure medical assistance.
- Nurse Ilona Eubank examined Clifton and concluded she was not in active labor because her water had not broken, describing it as a “false alarm.”
- Clifton requested hospital transport based on her prior obstetric history; she alleged Eubank denied the request and did not use fetal heart monitoring.
- Clifton was not returned to medical care until the following day, when she reported she could not feel fetal movement.
- Clifton was then transported to an outside hospital, where the fetus was determined to be dead; she delivered a stillborn.
- Clifton sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations and asserted a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

## Issues

1. Whether 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) bars a prisoner’s federal civil action seeking damages for mental or emotional injury when the alleged harm includes prolonged labor and stillbirth.
2. Whether the alleged obstetric harms constitute more than a de minimis “physical injury” sufficient to satisfy § 1997e(e).

## Decision

- The court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment premised on the PLRA bar.
- The court held that the alleged physical consequences—prolonged labor and stillbirth of an otherwise viable fetus—constituted more than de minimis physical injury under § 1997e(e).
- Because § 1997e(e) was satisfied, the PLRA did not preclude Clifton from pursuing damages associated with the alleged constitutional violations.

## Legal Principles

- Under the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), a prisoner may not recover for mental or emotional injury suffered in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.
- For § 1997e(e), the physical injury must be more than de minimis.
- Obstetric harms alleged to result from deliberate indifference—specifically prolonged labor culminating in stillbirth—qualify as more than de minimis physical injury.
- On summary judgment, the court views the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and denies judgment where the movant fails to show entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the asserted statutory bar.

## Conclusion

The court ruled that the PLRA’s physical-injury requirement did not bar Clifton’s § 1983 action because the alleged prolonged labor and stillbirth amounted to more than de minimis physical injury, allowing her claims for damages tied to the alleged constitutional misconduct to proceed.


Clifton v. Eubank, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (D. Colo. 2006)