## Facts

- California voters approved Proposition 209 (Cal. Const. art. I, § 31), prohibiting state and local entities from discriminating against or granting preferential treatment based on race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in public employment, education, and contracting.
- Civil-rights, labor, community organizations, and individual plaintiffs challenged Proposition 209 under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
- Plaintiffs alleged that, despite facial neutrality, Proposition 209 restructured the political process to uniquely burden minorities and women seeking race- or sex-conscious remedial measures.
- Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of Proposition 209 during litigation and also sought certification of a defendant class of covered state and local entities.
- State officials, including the Governor and Attorney General, defended Proposition 209’s constitutionality; some potential defendant-class members were aligned with plaintiffs’ view that Proposition 209 was unconstitutional.

## Issues

1. Whether plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their Equal Protection claim that Proposition 209 impermissibly restructured the political process to the disadvantage of minorities and women under the doctrine associated with *Hunter v. Erickson* and *Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1*.
2. Whether plaintiffs showed irreparable harm, a favorable balance of hardships, and consistency with the public interest sufficient to justify preliminary injunctive relief.
3. Whether proposed state-official representatives could adequately represent a defendant class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4) given conflicts among putative class members regarding Proposition 209’s constitutionality.

## Decision

- The court granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of Proposition 209 pending final adjudication.
- The court found plaintiffs showed a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their Equal Protection claim under the political-process restructuring doctrine.
- The court found irreparable harm because enforcement would require immediate suspension or dismantling of existing affirmative action programs, causing losses not readily remediable after the fact.
- The court concluded the balance of hardships favored maintaining the pre-enforcement status quo during litigation and that the public interest favored protecting constitutional rights.
- The court identified serious concerns about adequacy of representation for a proposed defendant class where putative class members held opposing positions on the constitutionality and desired enforcement of Proposition 209.

## Legal Principles

- A preliminary injunction may issue where plaintiffs show a strong likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury absent relief, and that the balance of hardships and public interest favor an injunction.
- Under the Equal Protection “political structure” doctrine, government may not reallocate decisionmaking authority in a way that singles out race- (and, as applied here, sex-) related remedial policies for uniquely burdensome political obstacles.
- Facial neutrality does not foreclose Equal Protection scrutiny where a measure’s practical effect is to impose a distinct political burden on groups seeking policies associated with race- or sex-conscious remedies.
- Rule 23(a)(4) requires that class representatives fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; fundamental conflicts over the litigation objective can defeat adequacy for a defendant class.

## Conclusion

The district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of Proposition 209, holding that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on an Equal Protection theory that the measure unlawfully restructured the political process to impose special obstacles on minorities and women seeking affirmative action, and concluding that irreparable harm, hardship balancing, and the public interest supported maintaining the status quo while the case proceeded.


Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996)