## Facts

- Patricia A. Cochran and Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. had a long-term, nonmarital relationship beginning in 1966 while Johnnie was married to his first wife.
- The couple had a son together, presented themselves socially as husband and wife, and owned a North Hollywood residence as joint tenants where Johnnie stayed about two to four nights per week.
- After Johnnie divorced his first wife (1978), Patricia discovered Johnnie’s infidelity; in 1983 the parties executed a written property-settlement agreement.
- Under the 1983 agreement, Johnnie quitclaimed his interest in the jointly owned residence to Patricia and assumed obligations including child support; Patricia later alleged the agreement was induced by fraud.
- After the 1983 agreement, the parties resumed their relationship in substantially the same form; Patricia alleged an additional express or implied promise that Johnnie would provide her “lifetime” support (a Marvin-type agreement).
- Johnnie married a second wife in 1985 but allegedly continued providing Patricia financial assistance and other support for years.
- Patricia filed a 1995 action alleging breach of the lifetime-support agreement; a prior appellate decision held the limitations period for breach began upon nonperformance.
- During that appeal, Patricia filed a separate 1996 action that initially pleaded rescission of the 1983 agreement but later proceeded on an emotional-distress theory; after remand, Johnnie filed a cross-complaint alleging Patricia breached confidentiality terms of the 1983 agreement.
- Patricia then filed a cross-complaint seeking rescission of the 1983 agreement for fraudulent inducement; the trial court sustained demurrers without leave and entered a dismissal judgment.
- The trial court also granted summary judgment against Patricia on the lifetime-support claim, reasoning in part that the relationship did not meet Marvin’s “cohabitation” requirement and that no enforceable agreement was shown.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court erred by sustaining demurrers without leave to amend and dismissing Patricia’s cross-complaint seeking rescission of the 1983 property-settlement agreement based on fraudulent inducement.
2. Whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment against Patricia on her claim for breach of an alleged Marvin-type lifetime-support agreement, including whether triable issues existed as to (a) contract formation/enforceability and (b) “cohabitation” where the parties did not live together full-time.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of dismissal entered after demurrers were sustained to the rescission cross-complaint.
- The Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for Johnnie on Patricia’s Marvin-type lifetime-support claim.
- The matter was remanded for further proceedings on both the rescission and lifetime-support claims.

## Legal Principles

- On demurrer, properly pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true; dismissal is improper where the pleading alleges specific facts that, if proven, could support rescission for fraudulent inducement.
- “Cohabitation” for Marvin-type contract claims is not limited to continuous, full-time residence together; it may be shown by a stable, significant relationship with shared domestic life and mutual support, even if one partner is present only part of the time or maintains another residence.
- Summary judgment is improper where evidence permits conflicting inferences on material facts such as whether the parties had an express or implied support agreement and whether their living arrangement functionally resembled a shared domestic household.
- For statute of limitations purposes, breach of a nonmarital support agreement accrues upon the obligor’s failure to perform as required.

## Conclusion

The Court of Appeal held that Patricia’s fraud-based rescission theory could not be terminated at the pleading stage on demurrer and that triable issues existed regarding both the existence of a Marvin-type lifetime-support agreement and whether the parties’ part-time shared residence and domestic relationship satisfied Marvin’s cohabitation requirement, requiring reversal and remand.


Cochran v. Cochran, 89 Cal. App. 4th 283, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899 (Ct. App. 2001)