Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977)

Facts

  • Elliott H. Velger was hired as a New York City police patrolman and discharged while still a probationary employee.
  • After leaving the New York City Police Department (NYPD), Velger obtained employment with the Penn Central Railroad Police Department.
  • During Penn Central’s background review, an officer accessed Velger’s NYPD personnel file pursuant to a release signed by Velger.
  • The file contained a notation that, as a trainee, Velger had “put a revolver to his head in an apparent suicide attempt.”
  • Velger alleged that the presence and communication of this notation caused his discharge from Penn Central and impaired his ability to obtain similar law-enforcement employment.
  • Velger sued New York City officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking reinstatement and damages, asserting he was discharged without a hearing or statement of reasons.

Issues

  1. Whether the Due Process Clause requires a name-clearing hearing for a discharged, non-tenured public employee when stigmatizing information is communicated in connection with termination but the employee does not allege the information is substantially false.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit.
  • The Court held that no due process name-clearing hearing is required absent an allegation (or finding) that the stigmatizing information is substantially inaccurate.
  • Because Velger did not assert in his pleadings or trial testimony that the suicide-attempt report was false, a hearing would not serve the constitutional purpose of correcting a false, defamatory charge.
  • The Court declined to decide whether Velger was stigmatized, because the failure to contest accuracy was dispositive.
  • A procedural due process “liberty” claim based on reputational harm in connection with termination requires, at minimum, an allegation that the government created and disseminated a false and defamatory impression about the employee.
  • A name-clearing hearing is limited in purpose: it provides an opportunity to rebut false charges, not to contest the employer’s judgment that discharge was warranted.
  • If the employee does not challenge the substantial accuracy of the disclosed information, due process does not require a hearing because the proceeding would lack a remedial function.

Conclusion

A discharged probationary public employee is not constitutionally entitled to a name-clearing hearing based solely on dissemination of stigmatizing personnel-file information; the Due Process Clause requires such a hearing only when the employee alleges the stigmatizing statement is substantially false.