## Facts

- In 1979, NATO member states decided to install nuclear warheads across Europe.
- In 1983, planned stationing began, including the construction and operation of launch facilities connected with U.S. missile deployment in West Germany.
- During this period, peace activists engaged in a range of protest actions (demonstrations, vigils, fasts, church services, petitions, and other mass actions) aimed at preventing installation.
- Protest actions escalated to include roadblocks at access roads in front of military installations, including at Mutlangen.
- Participants in these roadblocks avoided violence, sat passively on the roadway, and described the conduct as a non-violent symbolic blockade.
- State authorities prosecuted protesters involved in the roadblocks for coercion “using force” under § 240 of the German Criminal Code (StGB).
- Criminal courts convicted and sentenced multiple protesters, treating the sit-down blockade as coercion “by force” and finding unlawfulness through § 240(2) StGB’s “reprehensibility” requirement.
- The convicted protesters filed constitutional complaints challenging their convictions, arguing that applying § 240 StGB to passive sit-down blockades violated the legality principle in Article 103(2) of the Basic Law (GG). Several complaints were consolidated.

## Issues

1. Does § 240 StGB (coercion by “force”) satisfy Article 103(2) GG’s requirement of statutory certainty when ordinary courts apply it to non-violent sit-down road blockades?
2. Does Article 103(2) GG prohibit ordinary courts from extending the “force” element in § 240 StGB to passive sit-down blockades (as an impermissible analogy in criminal law)?
3. Does the Basic Law require that participation in such sit-down demonstrations remain free from criminal sanctions?
4. When § 240 StGB is applied to protest blockades, how must courts assess § 240(2) StGB’s “reprehensibility” element in light of fundamental rights such as expression and assembly?

## Decision

- The Federal Constitutional Court held that § 240 StGB, insofar as it criminalizes coercion “using force,” is sufficiently clear and certain to satisfy Article 103(2) GG.
- Because the First Senate was evenly divided, the Court could not determine that ordinary courts violated the prohibition on analogy by applying the “force” alternative in § 240 StGB to non-violent sit-down blockades; the challenged convictions therefore were not set aside on that basis.
- The Court held that the Basic Law does not require that participation in such sit-down demonstrations remain free from sanctions.
- The Court stated that § 240 StGB must be interpreted and applied in conformity with the Basic Law: when “force” is extended to sit-down blockades, a finding of “force” does not automatically establish unlawfulness.
- Courts must conduct a concrete evaluation under § 240(2) StGB (“reprehensibility”) that accounts for the circumstances and for the affected fundamental rights.
- Again due to an even division, the Court could not hold that it violates the Basic Law for criminal courts—after assessing the circumstances—to classify such sit-down demonstrations as “reprehensible” within the meaning of § 240(2) StGB.
- The constitutional complaints were rejected; the underlying criminal judgments remained in effect.

## Legal Principles

- Article 103(2) GG (nullum crimen sine lege) requires criminal statutes to be sufficiently definite and bars punishment based on judicial analogy that extends criminal liability beyond what the statute can bear.
- § 240 StGB’s statutory regulation of coercion “using force” satisfies Article 103(2) GG’s certainty requirement on its face.
- If the Federal Constitutional Court is equally divided, it cannot issue a finding of unconstitutionality; the constitutional complaint fails and the challenged decisions stand.
- The Basic Law does not grant categorical immunity from criminal punishment for participation in sit-down blockades, even when they are politically motivated and non-violent.
- When § 240 StGB is applied to demonstration blockades, § 240(2) StGB’s “reprehensibility” element functions as a limiting condition: unlawfulness requires a case-specific evaluation that takes account of the purpose of the protest, the manner and intensity of obstruction, duration, and the interests and rights affected (including freedoms of expression and assembly).
- A finding of coercive “force,” where that term is read broadly to cover passive sit-down blockades, does not by itself decide the unlawfulness question; § 240(2) must do independent work.

## Conclusion

In Coercion Case I (Mutlangen), the Federal Constitutional Court held that § 240 StGB is sufficiently definite under Article 103(2) GG, and—because the Senate split evenly—left intact ordinary-court convictions that treated non-violent sit-down road blockades as coercion “by force” and, after a circumstances-based assessment, as “reprehensible” under § 240(2); at the same time, the Court required that § 240(2)’s unlawfulness analysis be applied in a Basic-Law-consistent, rights-aware manner rather than being inferred automatically from a finding of “force.”


Coercion Case I (Mutlangen), 73 BVerfGE 206, 1 BvR 713/83, 1 BvR 921/84, 1 BvR 1190/84, 1 BvR 333/85, 1 BvR 248/85, 1 BvR 306/85, 1 BvR 497/85 (1986)