Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)

Facts

  • Paul Robert Cohen entered a public corridor of the Los Angeles County Courthouse wearing a jacket displaying the words “Fuck the Draft.”
  • The words were plainly visible; women and children were present in the corridor.
  • Cohen wore the jacket to communicate opposition to the Vietnam War and the draft.
  • Cohen did not shout, make unusual noise, threaten anyone, or engage in violence; no violence occurred because of the display.
  • He was arrested and convicted under Cal. Penal Code § 415 for “offensive conduct” disturbing the peace, based solely on the jacket’s message.
  • The California Court of Appeal affirmed, construing “offensive conduct” as behavior tending to provoke violence or disturb the peace; the California Supreme Court denied review.

Issues

  1. Whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments permit a state to criminalize the public display of a profane political message on clothing in a courthouse corridor as “offensive conduct” disturbing the peace.
  2. Whether the message fell within any unprotected category of expression, such as obscenity, fighting words, or incitement.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court reversed Cohen’s conviction in a 5–4 decision (Justice Harlan).
  • The Court treated the prosecution as punishment for expression, not regulable noncommunicative conduct.
  • The Court held the message was not obscenity because it was not erotic.
  • The Court held the message was not fighting words because it was not a direct, personal insult addressed to a particular person.
  • The Court found no showing of incitement or a concrete threat of violence; a generalized fear of disturbance was insufficient.
  • The Court rejected the state’s civility and listener-protection rationales where observers could avert their eyes.
  • Government generally may not make the public display of a profane political message a crime absent a specific and compelling justification consistent with the First Amendment.
  • The First Amendment protects the emotive force of language as well as its cognitive content; banning particular words risks suppressing ideas.
  • Profanity, without more, does not constitute obscenity; obscenity requires a significant erotic component.
  • “Fighting words” doctrine is limited to direct personal insults likely to provoke an immediate violent reaction; broad bans on “offensive” expression are constitutionally suspect.
  • Mere offensiveness to unwilling viewers in a public place, without targeted harassment or other recognized exception, does not justify criminal punishment.

Conclusion

The Court set aside Cohen’s breach-of-peace conviction, holding that the Constitution forbids criminalizing a profane, political slogan displayed in public when it is not obscene, not a direct personal insult, and not shown to incite or threaten violence.