## Facts

- A Texas district court entered a divorce decree between Jay Howard Cohen and Helene Renee Cohen on January 31, 1975; Jay did not appeal.
- The decree awarded Helene $219,600 from cash on hand: $27,000 due within 10 days and $192,000 due on or before February 1, 1985.
- The decree required Jay to pay interest at 10% per year on the unpaid principal beginning February 1, 1975, until the $192,000 was paid.
- The decree also provided that if the amount was not paid by February 1, 1978, the outstanding principal on February 1 of each succeeding year would be adjusted using a federal price deflator index.
- In December 1980, Jay filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking to have the 10% interest provision and the inflation-adjustment provision declared void.
- Helene filed a plea in bar asserting declaratory judgment was not available to attack a prior judgment; the trial court sustained the plea and dismissed the suit.

## Issues

1. Whether a declaratory judgment action may be used to collaterally attack provisions of a prior, final divorce decree that is regular on its face.
2. Whether the divorce decree was void on its face due to (a) a 10% interest provision allegedly inconsistent with a statute prescribing 6% post-judgment interest, or (b) an inflation-adjustment provision alleged to violate due process.

## Decision

- The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of Jay’s declaratory-judgment action.
- The court held the suit was an impermissible collateral attack on a final, unappealed divorce decree.
- The court concluded the divorce decree was not void on its face and therefore could not be challenged through declaratory relief.

## Legal Principles

- A declaratory judgment action cannot be used to collaterally attack, interpret, or invalidate a prior final judgment of a court when the judgment is regular on its face.
- A judgment of a court of general jurisdiction is subject to collateral attack only if the court lacked jurisdiction over the parties, the subject matter, or the power to enter the particular judgment.
- An unappealed divorce judgment that is regular on its face is not subject to collateral attack in a later suit.
- Alleged statutory or constitutional defects in the content of a judgment generally amount to error correctable on direct appeal, not voidness permitting collateral attack.

## Conclusion

Because the divorce decree was final, unappealed, and regular on its face, and there was no jurisdictional defect rendering it void, the declaratory-judgment action was an improper collateral attack and was properly dismissed.


Cohen v. Cohen, 632 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. App.—Waco 1982)