## Facts

- Patrick Coleman distributed pamphlets in Townsville, Queensland alleging police corruption and naming specific officers, including Constable Brendan Power.
- When Power approached and requested a pamphlet, Coleman loudly stated in public words to the effect that Power was “a corrupt police officer.”
- Power arrested Coleman for using “insulting words” in a public place under s 7(1)(d) of the Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931 (Qld).
- During the arrest, Coleman physically resisted, leading to additional charges and convictions for obstructing police and assaulting police under Queensland legislation, including the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 1997 (Qld).
- Coleman argued his speech was political communication about alleged police corruption and was protected by the implied freedom of political communication in the Australian Constitution.

## Issues

1. Whether “insulting words” in s 7(1)(d) should be construed narrowly so it applies only where the words are likely to provoke violence or a breach of public order.
2. Whether s 7(1)(d), as applied to political communication, impermissibly burdens the implied freedom of political communication and is invalid or must be read down.
3. Whether Coleman’s arrest was lawfully authorised, and if not, whether the obstruction and assault convictions could stand.
4. Whether international human-rights instruments may inform construction of a State statute enacted before those obligations were assumed.

## Decision

- The High Court allowed the appeal in part (4–3).
- The Court set aside Coleman’s conviction for using insulting words in a public place.
- A majority held the provision was constitutionally valid in general, but could not operate to criminalise political communication merely because it was insulting, absent a sufficient public-order justification (reached by reading down for some justices and partial invalidity for another).
- The Court upheld the convictions for obstructing and assaulting police.

## Legal Principles

- The implied freedom of political communication extends to State legislation and limits laws that burden communication on governmental or political matters.
- A law that burdens political communication must serve a legitimate end (such as public order) and be reasonably appropriate and adapted (proportionate) to that end.
- Broad “insulting words” offences, if applied to political criticism of public officials without a requirement connected to public-order risk, may impermissibly burden political communication.
- Courts may construe statutory language narrowly (including “reading down”) to preserve validity by confining speech restrictions to conduct posing a real risk to public order.
- International human-rights norms may assist interpretation where statutory language is ambiguous, but do not override clear text or independently invalidate State statutes.
- Obstruction and assault offences may remain valid notwithstanding the setting aside of an underlying speech offence where the later conduct constitutes independent criminal acts or the arrest power is otherwise sustained.

## Conclusion

The High Court held that criminalising public political criticism as “insulting words” impermissibly burdens constitutional protection for political communication unless tied to a genuine public-order risk, and therefore set aside Coleman’s insulting-words conviction, while leaving intact his convictions for obstructing and assaulting police.


Coleman v. Power, 220 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 2004)