## Facts

- McDonald’s held a company picnic at Lakelawn Lodge, a resort owned and operated by Ramada Hotel Operating Co.
- The picnic included a timed “mini olympics” event with an obstacle course.
- The first obstacle required participants to climb a playground slide backward (up the chute) and then go down the slide’s stairway/ladder on the back side.
- Peggy Coleman, a McDonald’s employee, chose to participate after watching another participant complete the obstacle.
- The slide was in good repair, stable, and had solid handrails; there was no hidden defect in the equipment.
- Coleman climbed up the chute successfully.
- While descending the stairway/ladder, Coleman held the handrails and stepped carefully, one step at a time.
- Near the top of the stairway/ladder, Coleman slipped and fell, fracturing her ankle and tearing a ligament.
- Coleman sued Ramada in federal district court (diversity), alleging negligence based on (1) failure to warn and (2) negligent operation of the obstacle course.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Ramada, reasoning that Coleman voluntarily assumed the obvious risks of the activity; it also denied Coleman leave to amend her complaint. Coleman appealed.

## Issues

1. Under Illinois negligence law, did Ramada owe a duty to warn or protect Coleman from the risk of falling while performing the backwards-slide obstacle, or was that risk open and obvious such that no duty arose?
2. Did Coleman’s voluntary participation in the obstacle course amount to primary implied assumption of risk that barred recovery as a matter of law?
3. Did the district court commit reversible error by (a) permitting Ramada to rely on assumption-of-risk concepts at summary judgment and (b) denying Coleman leave to amend her complaint?

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Ramada.
- The court held that the risk of slipping and falling while climbing a slide backward and descending its stairway/ladder was open and obvious to an adult participant; Ramada therefore had no duty to warn or otherwise protect Coleman from that risk.
- The court concluded that Coleman voluntarily chose to participate after observing the obstacle, so her claim was barred by primary implied assumption of risk, which negated any duty regarding the obvious risks of the game.
- The court rejected Coleman’s procedural objections, finding no unfair surprise in Ramada’s reliance on assumption-of-risk reasoning at summary judgment.
- The court also affirmed denial of leave to amend because the request was late and the new allegations would not change the duty analysis, making amendment futile.

## Legal Principles

- Under Illinois negligence and premises-liability rules, a landowner generally has no duty to warn or protect against dangers that are open and obvious to a reasonable person.
- When a plaintiff’s injury results from an obvious risk of a voluntary recreational activity (rather than a concealed defect), primary implied assumption of risk can negate the defendant’s duty and defeat a negligence claim.
- Summary judgment is appropriate when the material facts are undisputed and, on those facts, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the duty/assumption-of-risk analysis.
- Under federal pleading practice, a defense argument may be considered at summary judgment when the opposing party had fair notice and an opportunity to respond, even if the argument is not labeled in the precise terms the plaintiff prefers.
- A district court may deny leave to amend a complaint for reasons including undue delay and futility, particularly when the proposed amendment would not alter the controlling legal outcome.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Ramada because Coleman was injured by an open and obvious risk associated with a voluntary obstacle-course game, so Ramada owed no duty to warn or protect her from that risk; the court also found no reversible procedural error and upheld denial of amendment as untimely and futile.


Coleman v. Ramada Hotel Operating Co., 933 F.2d 470 (1991)