## Facts

- The opinion at **607 F. Supp. 1566 (N.D. Ill. 1985)** was issued in the case captioned in the district court as **Coleman v. Frierson** (later affirmed on appeal **sub nom. Coleman v. Smith, 814 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1987)**).
- Plaintiff **Samuel Coleman** had been a Robbins, Illinois police officer since 1948, later serving as a “Special Investigator” doing peace-officer work on special assignments after leaving full-time service in 1970.
- Coleman’s Special Investigator employment ended effective **December 1, 1977**.
- Coleman brought a civil action under **42 U.S.C. § 1983** against the **Village of Robbins** and individual officials, alleging his termination violated his **First and Fourteenth Amendment** rights (including claims tied to retaliatory action connected to his investigations).
- By **April 23, 1984**, the remaining defendants were the **Village of Robbins**, former Mayor **Marion Smith**, and former Police Chief **Gordon Frierson**.
- After repeated failures by defendants and their counsel to comply with court-driven litigation obligations, the court (in a prior order reported at **101 F.R.D. 541 (N.D. Ill. 1984)**) entered a **default judgment on liability** against the three remaining defendants as a sanction under **Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f)**, leaving **damages** for trial.
- In early **September 1984**, the case was tried to a jury on **damages only**. After three days of testimony, the jury awarded:
  - Against the Village of Robbins: **$34,000** lost wages and **$14,842** interest.
  - Against Frierson: **$125,000** compensatory damages (physical, mental, and emotional injury) and **$100,000** punitive damages.
  - Against Smith: **$250,000** compensatory damages (physical, mental, and emotional injury) and **$100,000** punitive damages.
  - Against Frierson and Smith jointly and severally: **$3,300** for legal and medical expenses.
- After the verdict, all defendants moved for **judgment notwithstanding the verdict** under **Rule 50** or, alternatively, for a **new trial** under **Rule 59**. Smith and Frierson also moved under **Rule 60(b)(6)** to vacate the earlier default judgment on liability.
- The district court’s published opinion at **607 F. Supp. 1566** resolves those post-trial motions.

## Issues

1. Whether Smith and Frierson showed the exceptional circumstances required for relief under **Rule 60(b)(6)** to vacate the prior **Rule 16(f)** default judgment on liability.
2. Whether, given the liability default, defendants could reassert **affirmative defenses** or other liability-focused arguments through Rule 50/59 motions after the damages trial.
3. Whether the jury’s damages awards (including emotional-distress compensatory damages and punitive damages against the individual defendants) lacked evidentiary support or were so excessive that **Rule 50** or **Rule 59** relief was warranted.
4. Whether the **Village of Robbins** could avoid liability on municipal-liability grounds (including arguments associated with **Monell**) after the entry of default and the damages verdict.

## Decision

- The court **denied** Smith’s and Frierson’s **Rule 60(b)(6)** motion to vacate the earlier default judgment on liability, finding no basis to reopen liability after a properly imposed sanction.
- The court **denied** all defendants’ **Rule 50** motions, concluding the evidence at the damages-only trial permitted the jury’s awards and did not justify taking damages away from the jury.
- The court **denied** all defendants’ **Rule 59** motions, finding no trial error or injustice that required a new trial or reduction of the verdict.
- The court treated **liability as conclusively established** by the default judgment and rejected post-verdict efforts to contest liability through defenses or arguments that should have been litigated before default.

## Legal Principles

- A court may enter **default as to liability** as a sanction under **Rule 16(f)** when parties (or counsel) repeatedly fail to comply with scheduling, pretrial, or litigation-management obligations and lesser measures have not worked.
- A **default judgment on liability** operates like an adverse merits determination on liability for the claims covered by the default; the remaining proceedings generally concern **damages**, not whether defendants are liable.
- After a liability default, defendants generally may not use **Rule 50** or **Rule 59** motions to revive **affirmative defenses** or other arguments aimed at defeating liability rather than addressing the amount of damages.
- **Rule 60(b)(6)** relief is reserved for truly unusual situations; dissatisfaction with the result, or a late desire to litigate defenses, is not enough—especially where the movants’ own conduct led to the sanction.
- In § 1983 cases, compensatory damages may include proven **emotional distress** and related harms; **punitive damages** may be awarded against individual defendants when the proof supports the required level of wrongful or reckless conduct.
- Municipal liability arguments do not provide a post-default route to retry liability where the municipality’s liability has already been fixed by default and the case has proceeded to a damages determination.

## Conclusion

In the district court decision reported at **607 F. Supp. 1566 (N.D. Ill. 1985)** (captioned **Coleman v. Frierson** and later affirmed on appeal **sub nom. Coleman v. Smith**), the court refused to set aside a Rule 16(f) default judgment establishing § 1983 liability and denied Rule 50 and Rule 59 challenges to a jury verdict rendered after a damages-only trial, leaving intact awards for lost wages and interest against the Village of Robbins and compensatory and punitive damages against former Mayor Smith and former Police Chief Frierson.


Coleman v. Smith, 607 F. Supp. 1566 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (if the reporter citation is accurate)