## Facts

- Frank Collin and the National Socialist Party of America (NSPA), a neo-Nazi political group, planned a brief public demonstration in Skokie, Illinois involving Nazi-style uniforms, swastikas, and political signs.
- Skokie had a large Jewish population, including many Holocaust survivors, and village officials anticipated severe emotional harm and possible disorder.
- After litigation over an initial injunction, the Village enacted three ordinances aimed at preventing the demonstration:
  - A parade/assembly permit system for events over 50 persons, requiring large insurance coverage and allowing denial if officials found the event would portray “criminality” or “depravity,” or “incite” hatred or hostility, or was for an unlawful purpose.
  - A criminal ban on disseminating materials that “promote and incite hatred” based on race, nationality, or religion.
  - A ban on political party members demonstrating while wearing “military-style” uniforms.
- The ordinances exempted certain governmental activities and allowed waiver by unanimous vote of the village board.
- NSPA applied for a permit and was denied.
- Plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

## Issues

1. Whether the permit and insurance ordinance imposed an unconstitutional prior restraint and granted impermissible discretion through content-based criteria.
2. Whether the ordinance criminalizing dissemination of materials that “promote and incite hatred” was an overbroad and vague content-based restriction on protected expression.
3. Whether the ban on “military-style” uniforms in political demonstrations impermissibly restricted protected symbolic expression.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment declaring all three ordinances unconstitutional on their face and enjoining enforcement.
- The court held the ordinances were content-based restrictions aimed at suppressing a disfavored viewpoint and did not fit within a recognized category of unprotected speech.
- The permit/insurance scheme functioned as a prior restraint and imposed financial barriers that could prevent unpopular groups from speaking.
- The hate-materials ordinance swept in protected advocacy because it punished hateful ideas without limiting punishment to incitement of imminent lawless action.
- The uniform ban restricted expressive conduct and was not justified by a narrowly tailored interest such as preventing imminent violence.

## Legal Principles

- Government may not restrict expression because of its message, ideas, subject matter, or content, absent a narrowly defined exception.
- Prior restraints and licensing schemes for speech-related activity must contain narrow, objective standards and may not vest officials with broad discretion to deny permits based on anticipated emotional impact or hostility to the speaker’s views.
- Financial requirements tied to expressive activity (including insurance mandates) are unconstitutional when they operate as prohibitive barriers, particularly for small or unpopular speakers.
- Speech may not be criminalized based on anticipated audience reaction; fear of disturbance or offense does not substitute for the requirement of imminent lawless action.
- Laws targeting “hate” or “hatred” are invalid when overbroad or vague and when they punish protected expression rather than true incitement, obscenity, defamation, or other established exceptions.
- Symbolic expression, including political uniforms and emblems, is protected when used to convey a political message, and categorical bans on such symbols are unconstitutional without a sufficiently compelling and narrowly tailored justification.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit held that Skokie’s permit/insurance, hate-materials, and political-uniform ordinances were unconstitutional because they imposed content-based restraints, operated as a prior restraint through discretionary permitting and prohibitive costs, and criminalized or suppressed protected speech and symbolic expression without meeting the narrow requirements for unprotected categories such as incitement to imminent lawless action.


Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978)