## Facts

- David Comber was prosecuted for a homicide arising from a street altercation in which the victim died after being struck in the face with a bare fist.
- Comber was tried in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
- After extended discussions with counsel, the trial court instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter as lesser-included offenses and modified standard instructions to address the required mental states.
- The jury convicted Comber of voluntary manslaughter.
- Comber appealed, primarily challenging the correctness of the jury instructions and seeking clarification of how District of Columbia homicide offenses are distinguished by mental state and mitigation.

## Issues

1. What mental states constitute “malice” for distinguishing murder from voluntary and involuntary manslaughter in the District of Columbia?
2. Whether voluntary manslaughter is limited to killings committed with a specific intent to kill, or may also rest on other malicious states of mind.
3. Whether a death caused by a bare-fisted blow may properly be submitted to the jury as voluntary manslaughter (as opposed to only involuntary manslaughter), depending on the defendant’s mental state.
4. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter and in explaining their elements.

## Decision

- The en banc court affirmed Comber’s voluntary manslaughter conviction.
- The court held that voluntary manslaughter is not confined to cases involving a specific intent to kill.
- The court explained that “malice” includes intent to kill, intent to inflict serious bodily injury, and conscious disregard of an extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury (absent justification, excuse, or mitigation).
- The court approved submitting both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter to the jury on these facts because the evidence could support different findings about the defendant’s state of mind.
- The court directed that jury instructions must clearly separate (a) malicious killings reduced by mitigation (voluntary manslaughter) from (b) killings without malice based on lesser culpability such as criminal negligence (involuntary manslaughter).

## Legal Principles

- “Malice” for murder is a term of art and may be shown by:
  - intent to kill,
  - intent to cause serious bodily injury, or
  - conscious disregard of an extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury.
- Voluntary manslaughter is a mitigated form of murder: the killing is committed with a malicious mental state, but mitigating circumstances (such as heat of passion upon adequate provocation) reduce the offense from murder to manslaughter.
- Voluntary manslaughter may rest on malicious mental states other than a specific intent to kill, including intent to inflict serious bodily injury or extreme recklessness.
- Involuntary manslaughter is an unlawful killing without malice, commonly based on criminal negligence or an unlawful act not reflecting the malicious states associated with murder.
- A bare-fisted assault causing death can support voluntary manslaughter if the factfinder can infer a malicious mental state (e.g., intent to use force that endangers life or an extreme-risk conscious disregard), and can support involuntary manslaughter if the conduct reflects lesser culpability without malice.
- Manslaughter instructions should not imply that voluntary manslaughter is merely “general intent” divorced from malice, nor that it is restricted to intent-to-kill cases.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed the voluntary manslaughter conviction and clarified District of Columbia homicide doctrine by defining malice to include serious-injury intent and extreme-risk conscious disregard, characterizing voluntary manslaughter as mitigated murder, and requiring jury instructions to distinguish voluntary manslaughter (malice plus mitigation) from involuntary manslaughter (no malice and lesser culpability).


Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26 (D.C. 1990)