## Facts

- A three-year-old child, Louise Osborn, was placed in foster care with Sarah and Matthew Augsburger through Youth Services of Mid-Illinois, Inc., a private nonprofit contracting with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) to provide foster-care services.
- Under its DCFS contract, Youth Services screened and monitored foster homes, created service plans, distributed foster-care funds, and conducted required visits in accordance with DCFS regulations and Illinois law.
- DCFS retained certain formal responsibilities (including licensing functions), while Youth Services handled day-to-day case management and oversight of placements.
- On July 29, 1993, Louise died in the Augsburgers’ home while enclosed in a bedroom closet.
- The estate alleged (1) Youth Services’ direct negligence in its placement/monitoring and (2) vicarious liability for Sarah Augsburger’s negligent supervision under respondeat superior.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence supported treating the foster mother as Youth Services’ agent or servant, rather than an independent contractor, so that Youth Services could be held vicariously liable under respondeat superior.
2. Whether the trial court should have granted Youth Services judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) because the evidence so favored Youth Services that no contrary verdict could stand.
3. Whether alleged evidentiary and instructional errors warranted a new trial if JNOV were not granted.

## Decision

- The appellate court reversed the denial of Youth Services’ posttrial motion for JNOV.
- The court held that, on the trial record, Youth Services could not be held vicariously liable for the foster mother’s supervision under respondeat superior.
- The court directed entry of judgment for Youth Services, rendering the alternative new-trial arguments effectively moot.

## Legal Principles

- Respondeat superior requires proof of a principal–agent (master–servant) relationship, including the principal’s right to control the manner and means of the alleged agent’s work; general oversight and regulatory compliance monitoring is insufficient.
- In Illinois, JNOV is proper only when all evidence, viewed most favorably to the nonmovant, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict could stand.
- A foster-care agency’s contractual duties to screen, place, and monitor foster homes do not, without evidence of detailed control over daily caregiving and supervision, convert foster parents into the agency’s employees for vicarious-liability purposes.

## Conclusion

The court held that the evidence did not establish the level of control necessary to treat foster parents as Youth Services’ servants, so the jury’s finding of vicarious liability could not stand and Youth Services was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.


Commerce Bank v. Youth Services of Mid-Ill., Inc., 333 Ill. App. 3d 150, 775 N.E.2d 297 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2002)