## Facts

- Angelo Todesca Corporation, a trucking and paving company, worked on a highway construction project using a ten-wheel tri-axle dump truck (AT-56) driven by employee Brian Gauthier.
- The company maintained a written safety policy requiring functioning back-up alarms on all trucks at all times.
- About a month before the fatal incident, Gauthier discovered AT-56’s back-up alarm was missing; the mechanic determined the truck needed a replacement alarm, but none was installed before the incident.
- Gauthier continued operating AT-56 without an alarm and repeatedly noted the missing alarm in required daily safety reports.
- At the work site, a police officer (Sergeant Deyermond) directed public traffic through the construction area.
- Gauthier stopped, shifted into reverse without a functioning alarm, and backed toward the officer, who was in the truck’s blind spot; the truck struck the officer, who later died.
- The collision occurred on a roadway open to and used by the public during the construction, with traffic controlled through the area.

## Issues

1. Whether a corporation may be held criminally liable for motor vehicle homicide under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24G(b) based on an employee’s negligent operation within the scope of employment.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational jury to find negligent operation and proximate cause beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the collision occurred on a “way” or place to which the public had a right of access under § 24G(b).
4. What standard governs review of the denial of a motion for a required finding of not guilty under Mass. R. Crim. P. 25(b)(2).

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the Appeals Court and reinstated the jury’s conviction.
- The court held a corporation may be convicted of motor vehicle homicide under § 24G(b) when its agent, acting within authorized corporate business, negligently operates a motor vehicle causing death.
- The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient for a rational jury to find negligent operation and proximate cause.
- The evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find the collision occurred on a “way” or place with public access within § 24G(b).
- The court applied the standard that the evidence must allow any rational trier of fact to find each element beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Legal Principles

- A corporation may incur criminal liability for motor vehicle homicide under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24G(b) based on an employee’s negligent driving committed within the scope of authorized corporate business.
- “Whoever” in § 24G(b) may include corporations, absent clear legislative exclusion; a corporation acts through agents, and public-safety statutes are construed to effect their protective purpose.
- In sufficiency review (including denial of a Mass. R. Crim. P. 25(b)(2) motion), the evidence is assessed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, asking whether a rational jury could find each element beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Evidence of a missing safety device required by company policy (here, a back-up alarm), combined with backing in a work zone with known pedestrian presence and blind spots, can support a finding of negligent operation.
- Proximate cause is satisfied where the injury is a foreseeable result of the negligent conduct and of the type the safety requirement was designed to prevent.
- A construction-zone roadway open to and used by the public, with traffic directed through the area, may constitute a “way” or place to which the public has a right of access under § 24G(b).

## Conclusion

The court affirmed that corporate criminal liability under § 24G(b) extends to deaths caused by an employee’s negligent driving within the scope of employment, and it held the trial evidence was sufficient to prove negligence, proximate cause, and the statute’s public-access location element.


Commonwealth v. Angelo Todesca Corp., 446 Mass. 128, 842 N.E.2d 930 (2006)