## Facts

- Baker (defendant) was prosecuted in Pennsylvania for receiving stolen goods under a provision enacted under the Pennsylvania Act of Assembly of 1909, which made it a crime to receive goods “knowing” they had been stolen.
- The Commonwealth’s theory was that Baker received property that had been stolen and that he had the required mental state at the time he received it.
- At trial, the judge instructed the jury that the offense could be found if Baker received the goods either (a) actually knowing they were stolen, **or** (b) “under such circumstances as would lead a man of reasonable prudence to suspect that they were stolen.”
- The jury found Baker guilty.
- Baker appealed, arguing that the statute required proof that he in fact knew the goods were stolen and that the “reasonable prudence to suspect” instruction allowed conviction on a lesser, objective standard.

## Issues

1. Whether a statute that criminalizes receiving stolen goods only when the defendant receives them “knowing” they were stolen permits conviction based solely on circumstances that would cause a reasonably prudent person to suspect theft.
2. Whether a jury instruction defining the mens rea as either actual knowledge or receipt under circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent person to suspect theft misstates the statutory requirement of “knowing.”

## Decision

- The court held that the statute requires proof that the defendant actually knew the goods were stolen at the time of receipt.
- The court ruled that the jury instruction was erroneous because it permitted conviction on an objective “reasonable prudence to suspect” standard, rather than the statute’s subjective “knowing” standard.
- The court recognized that knowledge may be established by circumstantial evidence, including suspicious circumstances surrounding the acquisition, but those circumstances must support an inference that the defendant **did** know—not merely that a reasonable person **would** suspect.
- The conviction was reversed and the case was returned for further proceedings consistent with the correct mens rea standard.

## Legal Principles

- When a receiving-stolen-goods statute requires that the defendant receive property “knowing” it was stolen, the Commonwealth must prove actual knowledge, not just negligence or what the defendant should have suspected.
- Suspicious circumstances (such as the manner of acquisition, price, source, or other red flags) may be used as evidence from which a jury may infer actual knowledge, but they do not replace the knowledge element.
- A jury instruction may not redefine a statutory knowledge requirement into an objective “reasonable person” test; doing so lowers the Commonwealth’s burden and conflicts with the statute’s text.
- Penal statutes are construed narrowly; courts should not expand criminal liability beyond the language chosen by the legislature through jury instructions that soften the required mental state.

## Conclusion

*Commonwealth v. Baker* holds that Pennsylvania’s receiving-stolen-goods statute, by its terms, requires proof that the defendant actually knew the goods were stolen when received; while surrounding circumstances may support an inference of that knowledge, a jury may not be instructed that suspicion-inducing circumstances alone satisfy the statute’s “knowing” requirement.


Commonwealth v. Baker, 175 A. 438 (1934)