## Facts

- Timothy Brown was charged as a joint venturer in an attempted armed robbery and home invasion at the Delgado residence.
- Two armed men entered the home and fatally shot Hector and Tony Delgado during the attempted offenses.
- The prosecution’s theory was that Brown knowingly assisted the planned crimes by supplying a pistol to one participant and providing hooded sweatshirts to conceal identities.
- Brown did not enter the home and did not shoot either victim.
- A jury convicted Brown of two counts of murder in the first degree on a felony-murder theory and of related firearm and ammunition offenses.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove Brown’s knowing participation in the predicate felonies as a joint venturer, supporting felony-murder liability.
2. Whether the felony-murder rule is unconstitutional.
3. Whether the common-law felony-murder doctrine should be narrowed so that murder requires proof of malice rather than “constructive malice” supplied solely by the felony.
4. Whether alleged instructional, evidentiary, prosecutorial-argument, and voir dire errors warranted relief under plenary review in a first-degree murder case.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court held the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find Brown knowingly participated in the attempted armed robbery/home invasion by intentionally assisting the perpetrators (including providing a firearm and disguising clothing).
- The court rejected the claim that the felony-murder rule is unconstitutional per se.
- Exercising its statutory authority in first-degree murder review, the court reduced Brown’s convictions from murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree, citing his relatively limited role.
- For future cases, the court prospectively narrowed felony-murder: strict-liability felony-murder would no longer operate as an independent theory of murder.
- The court rejected the remaining trial-error claims and denied a new trial.

## Legal Principles

- Joint-venture liability may be established by proof of knowing participation and intentional assistance in the commission or attempted commission of the predicate felony; physical presence at the crime scene is not required if the defendant aided the venture.
- The felony-murder rule is not unconstitutional per se under Massachusetts law.
- In trials commencing after the decision, a murder conviction requires proof of malice (one of the traditional prongs); the commission or attempted commission of a felony alone does not supply “constructive malice” sufficient for murder.
- After the decision (prospectively), felony-murder functions only in its statutory role as an aggravating element that can elevate what would otherwise be second-degree murder to first-degree murder when a killing occurs during the commission or attempted commission of an enumerated life felony.
- In plenary first-degree murder review, the court may reduce the degree of guilt where justice so requires, even when the evidence supports the verdict.

## Conclusion

The court upheld the sufficiency of the evidence for Brown’s accomplice liability but reduced the verdicts to second-degree murder based on his comparatively limited participation, while prospectively reforming Massachusetts felony-murder law to require proof of malice and limiting felony-murder to an aggravating role for first-degree murder in qualifying felony cases.


Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 81 N.E.3d 1173 (2017)