## Facts

- Around 2:00 a.m. on May 25, 1997, Wayland Coleman became involved in a group altercation outside a Worcester nightclub after two men attacked him.
- During or after the fight, Coleman disengaged, went to a nearby automobile, opened the trunk, and retrieved a firearm.
- Coleman turned back toward the fight and shot the victim at close range.
- There was no evidence the victim was armed at the time of the shooting.
- There was evidence Coleman fired a second shot while the victim lay on the ground.
- Coleman and three others fled in the automobile.
- The victim was transported to a hospital and died about two hours later from a gunshot wound to the chest.
- Coleman was indicted for first-degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm; a jury convicted him of first-degree murder on a deliberate premeditation theory and the firearm offense.
- Coleman challenged the sufficiency of proof of deliberate premeditation, sought dismissal based on the prosecutor’s presence during grand jury deliberations and voting, and requested extraordinary review relief.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Coleman killed with deliberate premeditation.
2. Whether the prosecutor’s presence during grand jury deliberations and voting, contrary to Mass. R. Crim. P. 5(g), required dismissal of the indictment on constitutional or supervisory grounds.
3. Whether relief was warranted under G.L. c. 278, § 33E to reduce the degree of guilt or grant a new trial.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the convictions for first-degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm.
- The evidence permitted an inference of deliberate premeditation, including Coleman’s break from the fight to retrieve a gun and the close-range shooting, with evidence of a second shot while the victim was on the ground.
- The prosecutor’s presence during grand jury deliberations and voting violated Mass. R. Crim. P. 5(g), but dismissal was not required absent a showing that the irregularity prejudiced the defendant or substantially impaired the grand jury’s independent judgment.
- The court declined to grant relief under G.L. c. 278, § 33E.

## Legal Principles

- Deliberate premeditation requires a decision to kill formed after reflection, however brief, and may be inferred from the sequence of events and manner of killing.
- Evidence that a defendant left a confrontation, obtained a weapon, and returned to shoot at close range can support a finding of deliberate premeditation.
- A prosecutor’s presence during grand jury deliberations and voting violates Mass. R. Crim. P. 5(g), but does not automatically invalidate an indictment without a demonstrated effect on the grand jury’s independence or the decision to indict.
- In first-degree murder cases, G.L. c. 278, § 33E authorizes broad appellate review, but relief is discretionary and may be denied where the record shows no basis to reduce the verdict or order a new trial.

## Conclusion

The court held that the jury could reasonably find deliberate premeditation based on Coleman’s departure from the fight to retrieve a gun and the manner of the shooting, and it refused to dismiss the indictment for the prosecutor’s improper presence during grand jury voting because no prejudice or substantial impairment of grand jury independence was shown; it also declined to exercise discretionary relief under § 33E.


Commonwealth v. Coleman, 434 Mass. 165, 747 N.E.2d 666 (2001)