## Facts

- John J. Hinds lived with and cared for his elderly mother in her Cambridge home amid a prolonged dispute with relatives over the mother’s care and control of the house.
- The mother had granted Hinds’s half-brother, Joseph Warren Beranger, a durable power of attorney; tensions escalated after Warren threatened to use it to sell the house.
- Hinds sought police assistance and obtained a temporary protective order against Warren; the order was later dismissed.
- On October 16, 1998, Hinds’s sister Patricia (“Patty”) entered the home while Warren and Warren’s wife Mary waited outside near a street corner.
- Inside, Patty yelled at the mother and threatened to place her in a nursing home; Hinds retrieved a gun from his truck, returned, and shot Patty in the head at close range (she survived with severe injuries).
- Hinds then walked about half a block to where Warren and Mary were standing, told them to leave him and his mother alone, and shot Mary in the head after she placed her hands on her pocketbook.
- Hinds shot Warren in the head and back after Warren moved his coat; both Warren and Mary died.
- Hinds called 911 and reported that he had killed his brother and sister-in-law and shot his sister; he waited for police.
- At retrial, a jury convicted Hinds of first-degree murder of Warren (deliberate premeditation), second-degree murder of Mary, armed assault with intent to murder Patty, and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon.
- On appeal, Hinds argued the judge should have instructed on voluntary manslaughter (reasonable provocation and excessive force in self-defense) and raised voir dire objections, also seeking relief under G.L. c. 278, § 33E.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence required a voluntary manslaughter instruction based on reasonable provocation for the killings of Warren and Mary.
2. Whether the evidence required a voluntary manslaughter instruction based on excessive force in self-defense.
3. Whether alleged voir dire error or other considerations warranted relief under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, including reduction of the first-degree murder verdict or a new trial.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions.
- The court held the trial judge properly refused voluntary manslaughter instructions on both reasonable provocation and excessive force in self-defense.
- The court found no prejudicial error in the voir dire procedure.
- The court declined to grant extraordinary relief under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, finding no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.

## Legal Principles

- A voluntary manslaughter instruction is required only if any view of the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the defendant, would permit a rational jury to find the elements of manslaughter rather than murder.
- Reasonable-provocation manslaughter requires (1) a heat of passion induced by adequate provocation and (2) insufficient time for cooling; the provocation generally must come from the victim or be fairly attributable to the victim.
- A victim who did not provoke the defendant cannot support a reasonable-provocation manslaughter instruction as to that victim.
- A significant temporal gap between alleged provocation and the killing can establish, as a matter of law on the record, sufficient time for cooling, defeating a provocation-based manslaughter instruction.
- Excessive-force manslaughter in self-defense presupposes an initial entitlement to use some force in self-defense; if the defendant was not entitled to use any force, an excessive-force instruction is not warranted.
- To raise self-defense, the evidence must support a reasonable belief of imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, necessity of force in the circumstances, and use of reasonable means to avoid combat when available.

## Conclusion

The court upheld Hinds’s murder convictions, ruling that the evidence did not permit a rational finding of voluntary manslaughter because one victim did not provoke him, any claimed provocation by the other was separated by sufficient time for cooling, and the circumstances did not support any lawful self-defense that could serve as a predicate for an excessive-force theory; the court also found no basis for § 33E relief.


Commonwealth v. Hinds, 457 Mass. 83, 927 N.E.2d 1009 (Mass. 2010)