## Facts

- Multiple defendants were indicted for murder in related cases where each victim died more than one year and one day after an alleged assault.
- In one set of cases, the Commonwealth alleged an assault on April 19, 1976, caused the victim’s death on May 30, 1978; murder indictments issued on September 8, 1978.
- In another case, the Commonwealth alleged an assault on October 22, 1977, caused the victim’s death on April 27, 1979; a murder indictment issued on June 13, 1979.
- Defendants moved in the Superior Court to dismiss the indictments, arguing a common-law “year and a day” rule barred homicide prosecutions when death occurs beyond that period after the criminal act.
- Trial judges reported the controlling legal question to the Supreme Judicial Court before trial.

## Issues

1. Whether Massachusetts common law recognizes a “year and a day” rule limiting homicide prosecutions when death occurs more than one year and one day after the act.
2. If such a rule existed historically, whether it should be retained in modern homicide law.
3. Whether rejecting the rule could be applied to pending prosecutions without violating fair-notice or due process limits.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court answered the reported questions in favor of the Commonwealth and allowed the murder prosecutions to proceed.
- The court held the “year and a day” rule is not part of Massachusetts common law of homicide and therefore does not bar the indictments.
- The court added that, even if the rule had once been recognized, its rationale is obsolete given modern medical science and ordinary evidentiary protections for proving causation.
- The court rejected defendants’ retroactivity objections, reasoning there was no settled Massachusetts homicide rule being altered; in any event, homicide liability still turns on proof of causation and other elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Legal Principles

- Massachusetts homicide law imposes no categorical “year and a day” time limit between the defendant’s act and the victim’s death; liability depends on proof of causation under ordinary criminal standards.
- Historical references to the year-and-a-day concept, tied to obsolete procedural practices, do not establish a substantive limit on modern public prosecutions for murder.
- Advances in medical and forensic proof reduce concerns that delayed deaths necessarily produce unreliable causation evidence; sufficiency review, expert testimony, and the reasonable-doubt standard address those concerns without an arbitrary cutoff.
- A court may clarify and revise common-law doctrine when an asserted rule lacks firm grounding or no longer serves its original purpose, so long as prosecutions still require proof of the offense’s elements.

## Conclusion

The court held that Massachusetts does not recognize a year-and-a-day bar to homicide prosecutions and that murder indictments may proceed even when death occurs beyond that period, provided the Commonwealth proves causation and the remaining elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt.


Commonwealth v. Lewis, 381 Mass. 411, 409 N.E.2d 771 (Mass. 1980)