## Facts

- A fire occurred in a three-story, nine-unit apartment building at 172–174 Pearl Street in Chelsea, Massachusetts on December 31, 1977.
- The defendant unexpectedly visited a first-floor apartment (174 Pearl Street) occupied by Santos Velasquez Murillo and family, where the defendant had stayed weeks earlier.
- Velasquez testified the defendant went into the bathroom during the visit; shortly after the defendant left, a fire began in the bathroom area.
- Other witnesses placed the defendant in or near the building at relevant times and described him leaving shortly before the fire was discovered.
- Fire-investigation experts testified the fire originated in the bathroom, involved an accelerant, and was incendiary rather than accidental.
- Three children in the building died as a result of the fire.
- Firefighter Trainor entered the building during firefighting/rescue efforts, collapsed on the roof, and was pronounced dead at the hospital.
- A medical expert testified Trainor died from coronary thrombosis precipitated by cold weather, the stress of firefighting, and smoke inhalation associated with the fire.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant willfully and maliciously set the fire and was guilty of arson and murder.
2. Whether the trial judge abused discretion by admitting expert testimony on the cause and origin of the fire and on medical causation of Trainor’s death.
3. Whether testimony implying the defendant had been present at other disasters was improperly admitted and, if so, required reversal.
4. Whether limitations on defense-requested voir dire questions were an abuse of discretion.
5. Whether the felony-murder instructions properly stated the required causal connection between the arson and Trainor’s death.

## Decision

- Affirmed the arson conviction.
- Affirmed three convictions of second-degree murder (on first-degree murder indictments) for the deaths of the three children under felony-murder principles.
- Reversed the second-degree murder conviction for the death of firefighter Trainor.
- Held the felony-murder causation instruction for Trainor’s death was inadequate because it allowed conviction if the arson was merely “a contributing cause” or “part of the proximate cause,” potentially permitting liability on a remote or trivial causal contribution.
- Found no reversible error in admitting the challenged expert testimony, handling of voir dire, or in the complained-of “other disasters” testimony, and declined to order a new trial or reduce the remaining verdicts under the court’s statutory review authority.

## Legal Principles

- On review of a denied directed-verdict motion, evidence is assessed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth; a conviction stands if a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Expert testimony is admissible where specialized knowledge will assist the jury, including fire-origin/cause opinions in arson cases and medical opinions on cause of death.
- Felony-murder requires a legally sufficient causal nexus between the felony and the death; the death must be a natural and probable consequence of the felonious conduct, not merely linked by any minimal or attenuated contribution.
- A felony-murder instruction is erroneous if it suggests liability may rest on a causal contribution “no matter how remote,” rather than requiring a meaningful proximate-cause connection.
- Trial judges have broad discretion in conducting voir dire; absent a showing that essential juror impartiality was compromised, refusal to ask particular requested questions is not reversible error.

## Conclusion

The court sustained the arson conviction and three felony-murder-based second-degree murder convictions for child victims, but reversed the second-degree murder conviction for a firefighter’s death because the jury charge did not adequately require that the death be a natural and probable consequence of the arson rather than a merely remote “contributing cause.”


Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 379 Mass. 810, 401 N.E.2d 342 (1980)