## Facts

- Troy Walter was prosecuted for first-degree murder and related offenses arising from the death of his infant son.
- The Commonwealth’s theory relied largely on medical evidence diagnosing shaken-baby/impact syndrome and on proof that the fatal injuries were inflicted while the child was in Walter’s care.
- At trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence that the infant previously suffered a broken leg described by medical witnesses as consistent with a twisting mechanism.
- The defense objected under Pa.R.E. 404(b) and unfair-prejudice principles, emphasizing there was no proof Walter caused the prior fracture.
- The trial court admitted the prior-fracture evidence only with a limitation: witnesses could describe the injury medically, but could not link the injury to Walter because the court found there was no evidence he caused it.
- In closing argument, the prosecutor referenced the prior broken leg in a manner that insinuated Walter had caused the earlier injury, despite the evidentiary limitation and the absence of supporting proof.
- The jury convicted Walter of first-degree murder, and he received a life sentence.

## Issues

1. Whether the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct by arguing, contrary to the evidentiary record and the trial court’s limitation, that Walter had previously injured the infant by breaking his leg.
2. Whether the improper insinuation of unproven prior abuse had an unavoidable prejudicial effect that deprived Walter of a fair trial and required a new trial.

## Decision

- The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed the judgment of sentence and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held the prosecutor’s summation improperly invited the jury to infer Walter committed prior child abuse by causing the earlier leg fracture, even though the record contained no evidence supporting that inference.
- The improper argument exceeded permissible inferences from the evidence and violated the trial court’s express limitation that the prior injury could not be attributed to Walter.
- In the context of an emotionally charged infant-death prosecution largely proven through circumstantial and expert evidence, the court could not conclude the misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Legal Principles

- Closing argument must be grounded in the evidentiary record; a prosecutor may argue reasonable inferences, but may not present theories resting on facts not proved at trial.
- Evidence suggestive of prior misconduct may not be used to invite propensity reasoning, particularly where the defendant is not linked by proof to the alleged prior act.
- Prosecutorial misconduct warrants a new trial when the unavoidable effect of the remarks is to prejudice the jury by creating fixed bias and hostility such that it cannot fairly weigh the evidence.
- In a close case, improper insinuations of prior child abuse carry a high risk of unfair prejudice and may preclude a finding of harmless error.

## Conclusion

Because the prosecutor’s closing argument urged the jury to attribute a prior injury to Walter despite the absence of evidence and a limiting ruling forbidding that connection, and because the insinuation likely affected the jury’s assessment in a case turning on circumstantial and expert proof, the conviction was reversed and the matter was remanded for a new trial.


Commonwealth v. Walter, 849 A.2d 265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)