Commonwealth v. Yourawski, 384 Mass. 386 (Mass. 1981)

Facts

  • The Commonwealth obtained indictments charging Thomas Yourawski (and, in a companion case, Dominic Rizzuto) with receiving, purchasing, and aiding in the concealment of “certain intellectual property contained in and on two video cassette tapes” of the movie Star Wars.
  • The indictments alleged the intellectual property belonged to Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, had a value over $100, and was known by defendants to be stolen.
  • The Commonwealth did not claim the physical video cassette tapes were stolen; only the intangible content embodied on the tapes was alleged to be stolen property.
  • A Superior Court judge dismissed the indictments for failure to allege a crime within G.L. c. 266, § 60, and the Commonwealth appealed.

Issues

  1. Whether the intangible “intellectual property” embodied in the content of a video cassette tape, when the physical tape itself is not alleged to be stolen, constitutes “property which has been stolen” for purposes of G.L. c. 266, § 60.

Decision

  • The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the dismissal of the indictments.
  • The court held that, as charged, the intangible intellectual content of the movie on the tapes was not “property which has been stolen” within the meaning of G.L. c. 266, § 60.
  • Federal decisions interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2314 concerning “goods, wares, [or] merchandise” were not controlling for construing Massachusetts larceny/receiving statutes.
  • Because the indictments alleged only receipt of intangible content (not stolen physical tapes), they failed to charge an offense under the statute.
  • Receiving stolen property under G.L. c. 266, § 60 requires receipt (or purchase or concealment assistance) of property that has in fact been stolen or embezzled, with knowledge of that status.
  • For § 60, whether something is “stolen property” depends on whether it is “property” capable of being the subject of larceny under Massachusetts law, including statutory expansions in G.L. c. 266, § 30(2).
  • Massachusetts criminal statutes defining punishable conduct and the scope of covered “property” are construed strictly; courts will not extend coverage to intangible intellectual content absent clear legislative direction.
  • Unauthorized copying or misuse of protected intellectual content may be unlawful under other legal regimes, but it does not automatically satisfy the elements of larceny or receiving stolen property as charged.

Conclusion

The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that indictments alleging receipt of only intangible movie content embodied on videotapes, without alleging theft of the physical tapes, do not state a crime of receiving stolen property under G.L. c. 266, § 60, and it upheld dismissal of the indictments.