## Facts

- The District of Columbia enacted D.C. Code § 22-2511, making it a felony for a person to be present in a motor vehicle if the person knows the vehicle contains a firearm, subject to limited lawful-carry/transport exceptions.
- The statute provided an affirmative defense that the defendant’s presence in the vehicle was involuntary, placing the burden on the defendant to prove involuntariness.
- Police stopped a car occupied by two people; a loaded handgun was in plain view between the front seats.
- Antwaun Conley, the driver, was charged with several firearm-possession offenses and one count under § 22-2511.
- No fingerprints were recovered from the firearm, and the government could not prove actual or constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Conley was acquitted of the possession charges but convicted of violating § 22-2511.
- Conley did not challenge the statute’s constitutionality in the trial court but raised a facial due process challenge on appeal, seeking relief under plain error review.

## Issues

1. Whether D.C. Code § 22-2511 violates due process by shifting to the defendant the burden to prove involuntary presence when voluntary continued presence after learning of the firearm is a critical component of criminal liability.
2. Whether § 22-2511 violates due process by criminalizing a failure to act (remaining in the vehicle after learning a firearm is present) without requiring proof that the defendant had fair notice of a legal duty to act, consistent with Lambert-type principles.
3. Whether allowing a conviction under § 22-2511 constituted plain error when the statute was challenged as facially unconstitutional for the first time on appeal.

## Decision

- The court held that D.C. Code § 22-2511 is facially unconstitutional because it violates due process.
- The statute was unconstitutional for two independent reasons: (1) improper burden shifting on voluntariness, and (2) punishing an omission without requiring proof of notice of a legal duty to act.
- The court concluded the statute could not be saved by severing the affirmative defense or by construing voluntariness as an element, because the notice problem would remain.
- Applying plain error review, the court determined the constitutional error was clear and required reversal.
- Conley’s conviction under § 22-2511 was reversed.

## Legal Principles

- Due process requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the facts essential to criminal liability; the legislature may not reclassify a critical component of the offense as an affirmative defense and place the burden of persuasion on the defendant.
- When criminal liability is based on a failure to take an action required by law, due process generally requires fair notice of the legal duty; punishing nonculpable inaction without such notice violates due process under Lambert-type limits on omission-based crimes.
- A statute may be facially invalid when its constitutional defects are structural and cannot be cured by severance or narrowing construction.
- Under plain error review, a conviction may be reversed when it rests on a statute that is plainly unconstitutional and the error affects substantial rights.

## Conclusion

The court reversed Conley’s conviction and invalidated D.C. Code § 22-2511 on its face, holding that due process was violated both by shifting to defendants the burden to disprove voluntariness and by imposing felony liability for remaining in a vehicle with a firearm without requiring proof of fair notice of a legal duty to act.


Conley v. United States, 79 A.3d 270 (D.C. 2013)