## Facts

- Ramiro Delreal Contreras was indicted for capital murder because the victim was under 14 years old.
- At the time of the prosecution, Alabama’s felony-murder statute, § 13A-6-2(a)(3), listed certain predicate felonies and included a residual clause for “any other felony clearly dangerous to human life.” Aggravated child abuse had not yet been added by name as a predicate felony.
- The trial court instructed the jury on felony murder as a lesser-included offense of capital murder, using aggravated child abuse as the predicate felony under the residual clause.
- Contreras objected based on the merger doctrine, arguing that aggravated child abuse merged into the homicide and therefore could not serve as the felony-murder predicate. The trial court overruled the objection.
- The jury found Contreras guilty of felony murder, and the court sentenced him to 50 years’ imprisonment.
- On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that the merger doctrine did not bar felony murder on these facts. The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari but later quashed the writ, and a certificate of judgment issued.
- Contreras later filed his first Rule 32 petition for postconviction relief. He alleged (1) that § 13A-6-2(a)(3)’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague as applied to his case and (2) that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise that vagueness argument at trial and on appeal.
- The State moved for summary dismissal and asserted multiple Rule 32 pleading and preclusion grounds, along with lack of merit. Contreras replied that the State’s broad list of preclusions violated Ex parte Rice and due process.
- Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court summarily dismissed the petition, ruling that the vagueness claim was procedurally barred because it could have been raised earlier and was also meritless; it also rejected the ineffective-assistance claim.
- Contreras appealed, again challenging the statute’s residual clause, counsel’s performance, and the summary dismissal procedure (including the Rice/due process objection and the lack of an evidentiary hearing).

## Issues

1. Whether Contreras’s as-applied vagueness challenge to § 13A-6-2(a)(3)’s residual clause (“any other felony clearly dangerous to human life”) was procedurally barred in Rule 32 proceedings and, if reached, whether the clause was unconstitutionally vague as applied when aggravated child abuse served as the predicate felony.
2. Whether trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise the as-applied vagueness challenge at trial or on direct appeal.
3. Whether the circuit court erred by summarily dismissing the Rule 32 petition without an evidentiary hearing and whether the State’s broad assertion of multiple preclusion grounds violated Ex parte Rice and due process.

## Decision

- The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s summary dismissal of Contreras’s Rule 32 petition.
- The court held that the as-applied vagueness claim was nonjurisdictional and precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (a)(5) because it could have been raised at trial and on direct appeal but was not.
- The court also rejected the vagueness claim on the merits, explaining that Alabama determines whether an “other felony” is “clearly dangerous to human life” by looking to the defendant’s real-world conduct in the case, not by imagining an “ordinary case” of the felony.
- Because the vagueness claim failed, the court held counsel were not ineffective for failing to raise it; a lawyer is not deficient for omitting an argument that would not succeed, and Contreras could not show prejudice.
- On the Ex parte Rice and due process challenge to the State’s response, the court concluded that any pleading defect was harmless because Contreras responded substantively, and the circuit court properly dismissed the claims as barred and without merit.
- The court held an evidentiary hearing was not required because the petition presented no material issue of fact that would entitle Contreras to relief.

## Legal Principles

- A nonjurisdictional constitutional claim is subject to Rule 32 preclusion if it could have been, but was not, raised at trial or on direct appeal. Rule 32 is not a substitute for another direct appeal.
- In applying § 13A-6-2(a)(3)’s residual clause, Alabama courts assess whether the predicate felony was “clearly dangerous to human life” based on the actual facts of the defendant’s conduct, rather than a hypothetical or “ordinary case” method.
- Vagueness analysis focuses on notice and enforceable standards; a case-specific, conduct-based application can avoid the uncertainty problems associated with residual clauses that require speculative risk assessments.
- Under Strickland, counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim; when the underlying legal theory fails, both deficient performance and prejudice are lacking.
- Ex parte Rice requires the State to plead Rule 32 preclusion grounds with enough specificity to give notice, but a shortcoming in the State’s pleading does not warrant relief absent prejudice; dismissal may be affirmed where the record shows the claims are barred or fail as a matter of law.
- Summary dismissal without an evidentiary hearing is proper when the pleadings and record show no material factual dispute and the petitioner is not entitled to relief.

## Conclusion

Contreras’s postconviction attack on Alabama’s felony-murder residual clause failed because the vagueness claim was procedurally barred and, in any event, the clause was sufficiently definite when applied through a conduct-based review of what occurred. Since the vagueness argument lacked merit, counsel’s failure to raise it could not support ineffective assistance, and any claimed due process problem arising from the State’s broad list of preclusion grounds was harmless where the claims were properly dismissed without a hearing.


Contreras v. State, 328 So. 3d 911, 2020 WL 3888332 (2020)