## Facts

- Private William Doyle was a member of the Irish Defence Forces.
- Doyle had an alcohol addiction and left his unit without authority (AWOL).
- He remained absent for a very long period (well beyond six months), during which he worked in various civilian jobs.
- During his absence, Doyle served in the French Foreign Legion for about five years.
- After roughly 12 years, Doyle gained control of his alcohol problem and sought to return to the Irish Defence Forces.
- The Defence Forces charged Doyle with desertion under s. 135 of the Defence Act 1954, which treats desertion as including absence without leave with an intention to remain permanently absent.
- Section 135 provided a rebuttable presumption that a person absent without leave for six months or more is presumed to have intended to remain permanently absent, unless the contrary is proved.
- At a limited court-martial, the prosecution proved Doyle’s military status and the fact and duration of his unauthorized absence, then relied on the statutory presumption to establish intent.
- Doyle admitted the absence but gave evidence that he had not intended to stay away permanently and challenged the accuracy of the presumption in his circumstances.
- The limited court-martial convicted Doyle of desertion and ordered his discharge from the Defence Forces as punishment.
- Doyle appealed to the Courts-Martial Appeal Court, arguing that the reverse-onus presumption offended the presumption of innocence.

## Issues

1. Whether s. 135 of the Defence Act 1954, by presuming an intention to remain permanently absent after six months’ AWOL “unless the contrary is proved,” places a legal (persuasive) burden on the accused rather than only an evidential burden.
2. If s. 135 imposes a legal burden, whether that reverse onus is consistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence and the requirement that guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
3. Whether, on the evidence (including Doyle’s testimony), the desertion conviction could stand once the statutory presumption was applied.

## Decision

- The Courts-Martial Appeal Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and discharge.
- The court treated s. 135 as creating a legal (persuasive) burden on the accused to disprove the presumed intention to remain permanently absent once the prosecution proved the basic facts triggering the presumption.
- The court held that this statutory scheme was not unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful merely because it shifted the burden on the issue of intent in the defined circumstances set out in s. 135.

## Legal Principles

- A statutory presumption may allow (and, depending on its wording, require) a court-martial to infer an element such as intent from proved foundational facts, while still remaining rebuttable by the accused.
- Under s. 135 of the Defence Act 1954, proof that a soldier was absent without leave for six months or more triggers a presumption that the soldier intended to remain permanently absent, “unless the contrary is proved.”
- Language of the form “unless the contrary is proved” can impose a legal (persuasive) burden on the accused, not merely a burden to point to some evidence.
- Even where a statute places a legal burden on an accused, the prosecution must still prove the triggering facts for the presumption (such as status, unauthorized absence, and duration) to the required standard.
- In assessing compatibility with the presumption of innocence, the court accepted that the Oireachtas may, in a defined context such as military discipline, assign to the accused the burden of proving a specified matter to rebut a presumption, provided the presumption is rebuttable and the accused has a real chance to contest it.

## Conclusion

Convening Authority v. Private Doyle upheld a desertion conviction where the prosecution proved Doyle’s prolonged unauthorized absence and relied on s. 135’s rebuttable presumption that absence for six months or more implies an intention to remain permanently absent; the Courts-Martial Appeal Court treated the provision as placing a legal burden on Doyle to prove the contrary and rejected the argument that this reverse-onus scheme violated the presumption of innocence.


Convening Authority v. Private Doyle, 2 ILRM 213 (1996)