## Facts

- Cooper Industries owned four aircraft-engine maintenance sites in Texas and sold them to Aviall Services in 1981.
- After operating the sites, Aviall discovered soil and groundwater contamination attributable to both Cooper and Aviall.
- Aviall notified the Texas environmental agency; neither Texas nor the federal government initiated judicial or administrative proceedings to compel cleanup.
- Aviall performed cleanup under state supervision and faced at least $5 million in response costs.
- Aviall sued Cooper in federal court seeking to shift cleanup costs under CERCLA, ultimately proceeding on a claim for contribution under CERCLA § 113(f)(1) against Cooper as a potentially responsible party under § 107(a).

## Issues

1. Whether a party that voluntarily incurs cleanup costs, but has not been sued under CERCLA § 106 or § 107(a), may seek contribution from other potentially responsible parties under CERCLA § 113(f)(1).
2. Whether § 113(f)(1)’s saving clause independently authorizes contribution in the absence of a CERCLA civil action.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the en banc Fifth Circuit and remanded.
- The Court held that a private party that has not been sued under CERCLA § 106 or § 107(a) may not obtain contribution under § 113(f)(1).
- The Court declined to address whether Aviall could have proceeded under a freestanding § 107(a) cost-recovery theory because that claim was treated as abandoned in the lower courts.

## Legal Principles

- CERCLA § 113(f)(1) authorizes contribution only “during or following” a civil action under CERCLA § 106 or § 107(a); the existence of such an action is a statutory precondition.
- The § 113(f)(1) saving clause preserves contribution rights that exist independently of § 113(f)(1), but it does not itself create or expand a federal contribution cause of action beyond the enabling clause’s limits.
- CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B) provides a separate, express contribution right when a party resolves CERCLA liability to the United States or a State through an administrative or judicially approved settlement, reinforcing that § 113(f)(1) is not a general contribution remedy for voluntary cleanups.

## Conclusion

The Court limited CERCLA § 113(f)(1) contribution claims to parties pursuing contribution during or after a CERCLA § 106 or § 107(a) civil action, leaving voluntary cleaners who were not sued to rely on other statutory avenues (such as qualifying settlements under § 113(f)(3)(B)) or non-CERCLA contribution rights preserved by the saving clause.


Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004)