## Facts

- Graham Cooper, a serving Royal Air Force member, was tried for theft by a district court-martial in February 1998.
- The court-martial consisted of a permanent president (RAF officer), two other RAF officer members, and a civilian judge advocate.
- Cooper was convicted and sentenced to 56 days’ imprisonment, reduction in rank, and dismissal from service.
- Under the Armed Forces Act 1996 framework, service authorities had roles in convening, administration, prosecution arrangements, and post-trial processes.
- A reviewing authority upheld the conviction and sentence after receiving advice from the Judge Advocate General.
- Cooper’s appeal to the Courts-Martial Appeal Court was unsuccessful.
- Cooper applied to the European Court of Human Rights, alleging his court-martial was not an independent and impartial tribunal; a separate case-specific unfairness complaint was declared inadmissible.

## Issues

1. Whether Cooper’s RAF district court-martial constituted an independent and impartial tribunal established by law as required by Article 6 § 1.
2. Whether the United Kingdom’s post-1996 court-martial system was, in principle, incompatible with Article 6 § 1 due to structural command influence and post-trial review.

## Decision

- The Grand Chamber unanimously held there was no violation of Article 6 § 1.
- The court-martial system as applied to Cooper, assessed as a whole, provided sufficient guarantees of independence and impartiality.
- The involvement of pre-trial and administrative service authorities did not show decisive influence over findings or sentence.
- The post-trial reviewing authority did not undermine tribunal independence where it operated only in the accused’s favor and appellate review remained available.

## Legal Principles

- Independence under Article 6 § 1 is assessed by the method of appointment, tenure, safeguards against outside pressure, and the appearance of independence.
- Impartiality includes subjective impartiality and an objective test asking whether objectively justified doubts arise from ascertainable facts.
- Service tribunals are not inherently incompatible with Article 6; they must provide fair-trial guarantees comparable to ordinary criminal courts.
- A civilian judge advocate with judicial-type independence and authority to manage proceedings and give legal directions is a significant safeguard supporting independence and impartiality.
- Structural separation of prosecutorial decision-making from the chain of command, combined with regulations limiting administrative influence on tribunal composition and deliberations, supports compliance with Article 6.
- Post-trial review by a military reviewing authority does not, by itself, negate independence where it cannot aggravate sentence, functions as an accused-protective mechanism, and is paired with effective appellate scrutiny.

## Conclusion

The Grand Chamber concluded that, considering the civilian judge advocate’s role, protections against command influence, prosecutorial and administrative arrangements, and the limited, accused-favoring nature of post-trial review with appellate oversight, Cooper’s court-martial satisfied Article 6 § 1 requirements for an independent and impartial tribunal.


Cooper v. United Kingdom, 39 E.H.R.R. 8 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2003)