## Facts

- Lynette Copland worked for a public further/higher education college in Wales; the college’s acts were attributable to the state for Convention purposes.
- In 1998–1999, at the deputy principal’s direction, the college monitored Copland’s workplace communications.
- The monitoring collected telephone traffic data (dates, lengths of calls, and numbers dialed), email traffic data (addresses and timestamps), and internet usage data (websites visited, dates/times, and duration).
- The government contended that the college did not monitor call or email content; Copland alleged extensive logging and that the deputy principal learned the identity of at least one contact.
- Copland was not warned that her telephone, email, or internet use could be monitored, and the college had no monitoring policy.
- At the time, there was no specific domestic legal framework regulating employer monitoring of employee telephone, email, or internet use; later legislation and regulations were not in force during the relevant period.
- Copland applied to the European Court of Human Rights alleging violations of Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention.

## Issues

1. Whether collecting and storing workplace telephone, email, and internet usage data constituted an interference with Copland’s rights to respect for private life and correspondence under Article 8.
2. If there was an interference, whether it was justified under Article 8(2) as “in accordance with the law” and otherwise permissible.
3. Whether Copland had an effective domestic remedy under Article 13 for the alleged Article 8 violation.

## Decision

- The court held that monitoring and collecting workplace telephone, email, and internet usage data interfered with Copland’s Article 8 rights.
- The court found Copland had a reasonable expectation of privacy because she received no notice of monitoring and there was no college policy authorizing it.
- The interference was not “in accordance with the law” because no sufficiently clear, accessible, and foreseeable domestic law authorized the monitoring with adequate safeguards.
- The court found a violation of Article 8.
- The court held Article 13 did not give rise to a separate issue in the circumstances.
- The court awarded non-pecuniary damages and costs and expenses.

## Legal Principles

- Workplace telephone calls, email, and internet use are prima facie protected as “private life” and “correspondence” under Article 8.
- Traffic/metadata (e.g., numbers dialed, call duration, email addresses, websites visited, and timing) can be an integral element of communications; its collection and storage may alone constitute an Article 8 interference.
- Storing personal data connected to an individual’s private life falls within Article 8 even if the data are not disclosed or used in disciplinary proceedings.
- An Article 8 interference must have a legal basis meeting quality requirements (accessibility, foreseeability, and safeguards); broad or general institutional powers are insufficient.
- Lack of notice and the absence of an employer monitoring policy support a finding of a reasonable expectation of privacy in workplace communications.

## Conclusion

The court ruled that a public employer’s covert collection of an employee’s telephone, email, and internet usage data violated Article 8 because it lacked a clear and foreseeable legal basis with safeguards, and it treated Article 13 as adding no distinct question on the facts.


Copland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 62617/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 3, 2007)