## Facts

- On May 9, 1977, the Lincoln City Council approved Ordinance No. 11976, amending the zoning ordinance to reclassify a tract in southwest Lancaster County from “G–Local Business District” and “A‑1 Single Family Dwelling District” to “J‑1 Planned Regional Commercial District.”
- Newt Copple, a Lincoln and Lancaster County resident and taxpayer, owned land in the northeast section of Lancaster County (the northeast quarter of Section 18, Township 9 North, Range 7 East).
- Copple had a pending application and related matters concerning his plan to build a regional shopping center on his property.
- Copple claimed the city council’s rezoning would allow development of a competing regional shopping center and would detrimentally affect him and his property through increased business competition.
- Copple filed a “petition on appeal” in the District Court for Lancaster County under Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 15‑1201 and 15‑1202 (Reissue 1977), alleging the city council acted arbitrarily and capriciously in enacting the zoning amendment.
- After hearing the case, the district court dismissed the appeal, finding Copple was not a “person aggrieved,” lacked standing, and (even if standing existed) failed to prove a special injury unique to him.
- Copple appealed the dismissal to the Nebraska Supreme Court.

## Issues

1. Do Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 15‑1201 and 15‑1202 authorize an appeal to the district court from a city council’s legislative act of adopting or amending a zoning ordinance?
2. Is a developer a “person aggrieved” with standing to challenge a rezoning when the claimed harm is economic loss from increased business competition and related effects on a proposed project?

## Decision

- The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal.
- The court held that a statutory appeal does not lie from the city council’s purely legislative act of enacting a zoning amendment; §§ 15‑1201 and 15‑1202 apply only when the listed municipal bodies act judicially or quasi‑judicially.
- The court held that reading § 15‑1201 to allow appeals from legislative zoning enactments would amount to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the judiciary, contrary to Neb. Const. art. II, § 1 (separation of powers).
- The court further held that, even apart from appealability, Copple lacked standing because he did not show a special injury different in kind from that suffered by the public; increased business competition alone is insufficient.
- Because the dismissal was proper on either ground, the court did not provide appellate relief on Copple’s arbitrariness claims in this appeal posture.

## Legal Principles

- A statutory appeal or error proceeding does not lie from a purely legislative act by a public body acting under delegated legislative authority.
- Neb. Rev. Stat. § 15‑1201 applies only when the city council or other listed municipal bodies act judicially or quasi‑judicially; it cannot be constitutionally construed to permit an appeal from a legislative enactment.
- Interpreting the appeal statute to authorize appellate-style review of legislative zoning choices would violate Nebraska’s separation of powers (Neb. Const. art. II, § 1).
- A challenge to a legislative enactment must be brought by collateral attack, such as an injunction or other suitable independent action, rather than by statutory appeal under §§ 15‑1201 and 15‑1202.
- To have standing as an “aggrieved person” to attack a change of zone, a plaintiff must show a special injury different in kind from that suffered by the general public.
- An increase in business competition, by itself, does not constitute the required special injury and does not confer standing to challenge a rezoning.

## Conclusion

The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed dismissal because the city council’s rezoning ordinance was a legislative enactment not reviewable by statutory appeal under §§ 15‑1201 and 15‑1202, and because Copple—asserting harm from a competing shopping center—did not show a special injury distinct from the public and therefore was not a “person aggrieved” with standing.


Copple v. City of Lincoln, 315 N.W.2d 628 (1982)