## Facts

- Al Baker Maintenance Company owned two adjoining parcels: Parcel 1 (intended to provide parking) and Parcel 2 (intended for an apartment building).
- In 1962, while the company still owned both parcels, it executed a written declaration attempting to create a “perpetual” parking easement over Parcel 1 for the benefit of Parcel 2.
- The parties later agreed the 1962 declaration was invalid because an owner cannot create an easement making one part of a unified tract servient to another part while title remains in the same owner.
- By 1964, the apartment building on Parcel 2 had been constructed, and the company severed title by conveying Parcel 2 to Lewis & Thos. Saltz, Inc., and conveying Parcel 1 to Al Baker.
- In 1964, after taking title to Parcel 1, Baker signed and recorded a new declaration stating that it “created and established” a parking easement on Parcel 1 for seven cars “for the benefit of the owner and occupants” of the apartments on Parcel 2, for as long as the apartment building existed.
- The 1964 declaration also stated that the easement “shall be a covenant running with the title” to Parcel 1.
- Baker later conveyed Parcel 1 to Bernard R. Corbett and others (plaintiffs). Saltz later conveyed Parcel 2 to Ralph H. Ruben and others (defendants).
- Corbett filed a suit to quiet title, claiming the 1964 declaration did not create a valid easement (or, if it did, that it was not binding on successors).
- The trial court ruled for Ruben, holding Parcel 1 was burdened by an easement appurtenant to Parcel 2. Corbett appealed.

## Issues

1. Did the 1964 recorded declaration create a valid easement over Parcel 1, even though it did not use traditional words of grant?
2. Were the beneficiaries (“the owner and occupants of the apartments” on Parcel 2) described with enough certainty for a valid easement grant?
3. Was the parking right appurtenant to Parcel 2 (and thus transferable with that land), rather than an easement in gross, and could it be limited to last only while the apartment building existed?

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial court’s decree.
- The 1964 declaration created a valid parking easement over Parcel 1 for seven cars.
- The instrument’s language (“create and establish”) sufficiently showed an intent to grant an easement; no special formula was required.
- The description of the beneficiaries as the “owner and occupants” of the apartments on Parcel 2 was definite enough because it identified a distinguishable class tied to a specific parcel.
- The easement was appurtenant to Parcel 2, not in gross.
- The easement could be determinable in duration and could terminate when the apartment building ceased to exist.
- Because the easement was appurtenant and the instrument was recorded, the burden on Parcel 1 and the benefit to Parcel 2 passed to successors in title.

## Legal Principles

- An easement may be created without technical wording if the instrument, read as a whole, clearly shows the grantor’s intent and is not reasonably open to a different meaning.
- The grantees of an easement need not be individually named if they are described with enough certainty to distinguish them from others.
- Whether an easement is appurtenant or in gross turns on the parties’ intent; when an easement is tied to the use and enjoyment of an identified dominant parcel, it is treated as appurtenant.
- An appurtenant easement need not be perpetual; it may be set to end when the purpose for which it was created ends (a determinable easement).
- An appurtenant easement ordinarily passes with the dominant estate and continues to burden the servient estate in the hands of successors, particularly where the easement is recorded and the instrument states it runs with title.

## Conclusion

Corbett v. Ruben upheld a 1964 recorded declaration that “created and established” a seven-car parking easement over Parcel 1 for the benefit of the apartment parcel (Parcel 2), held that the beneficiary class (“owner and occupants”) was sufficiently identified, treated the easement as appurtenant rather than personal, allowed it to be limited to the life of the apartment building, and confirmed that both the burden and benefit bound subsequent purchasers.


Corbett v. Ruben, 290 S.E.2d 847 (1982)