## Facts

- When he was 16 years old, James Steven Corder killed his stepmother and burned down the family home in Iowa.
- The State filed a juvenile delinquency petition in Iowa juvenile court.
- The juvenile court made a probable-cause determination in connection with a detention order, based on the State’s complaint and an investigator’s affidavit summarizing evidence and witness statements.
- The State moved to waive juvenile court jurisdiction so Corder could be prosecuted as an adult under Iowa Code § 232.45.
- At the juvenile waiver hearing, Corder was represented by appointed counsel.
- To satisfy Iowa’s statutory probable-cause requirement for waiver, the juvenile court relied on its earlier probable-cause determination reflected in the detention order rather than receiving live witness testimony at the waiver hearing.
- Corder was tried as an adult and convicted of first-degree murder and second-degree arson.
- On direct appeal in Iowa, Corder challenged the waiver decision; the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions.
- Corder later sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that the waiver procedure violated federal due process because the juvenile court did not hear witness testimony when making the probable-cause finding for waiver.
- The federal district court denied the petition but granted a certificate of appealability limited to the waiver/due-process issue, and Corder appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether Corder’s federal due-process challenge to Iowa’s juvenile-waiver probable-cause procedure was procedurally defaulted because he did not fairly present the federal constitutional claim to the Iowa appellate courts.
2. If the claim was not barred, whether clearly established Supreme Court law required the juvenile court to take live testimony (or to make a new probable-cause determination at the waiver hearing) rather than relying on an earlier affidavit-based probable-cause finding.

## Decision

- The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of § 2254 relief.
- The court held that Corder’s federal due-process argument was procedurally defaulted because his state appellate presentation framed the waiver issue as an abuse-of-discretion matter under state law, which did not fairly present a federal constitutional claim.
- The court concluded Corder had not overcome the default (such as by showing cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice).
- In the alternative, the court explained that even if the merits were reached, Supreme Court juvenile-transfer precedent did not clearly establish a requirement that probable cause at a waiver hearing be proven through live witness testimony, and that probable-cause determinations need not include the full set of adversarial trial procedures.

## Legal Principles

- A federal habeas petitioner must fairly present the substance of a federal constitutional claim to the state courts; presenting only a state-law abuse-of-discretion argument does not, by itself, present a federal due-process claim.
- A claim that was not properly presented in state court may be procedurally barred in federal habeas unless the petitioner shows a recognized basis to excuse the default (such as cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice).
- Under AEDPA, federal habeas relief is limited when the state-court adjudication is not contrary to, and does not unreasonably apply, clearly established Supreme Court law.
- Juvenile transfer proceedings must satisfy due process, but clearly established Supreme Court precedent does not require that a probable-cause showing at the transfer stage be made through live testimony or other trial-like procedures; affidavit-based probable cause may be sufficient.

## Conclusion

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of Corder’s § 2254 petition because his federal due-process challenge to the juvenile court’s waiver procedure was procedurally barred for failure to fairly present it as a constitutional claim in state court, and the court also indicated that, in any event, Supreme Court law did not clearly require live testimony or a new probable-cause hearing at the juvenile waiver stage.


Corder v. Rogerson, 192 F.3d 1165 (1999)