## Facts

- Penelope Corgan sought psychological treatment from Conrad Muehling from March 1979 to October 1980.
- Muehling publicly represented himself as a registered psychologist, but he lacked the required registration.
- During treatment, Muehling repeatedly engaged in sexual intercourse with Corgan under the guise of therapy.
- Corgan alleged resulting severe emotional distress, including fear, shame, humiliation, and guilt, and a need for additional psychotherapy.
- Corgan’s third-amended complaint included negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claims and a claim asserting a nuisance-type theory based on violations of the Psychologist Registration Act.

## Issues

1. Must a direct victim pleading NIED satisfy the zone-of-danger and physical-manifestation limitations associated with bystander NIED claims under *Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority*?
2. Does the Illinois Psychologist Registration Act implicitly create a private right of action for nuisance (or a similar private civil remedy) based on unlicensed practice?

## Decision

- The court held that *Rickey*’s bystander limitations do not apply to direct victims seeking emotional-distress damages for negligence.
- The court held that the Psychologist Registration Act does not implicitly authorize a private nuisance-based cause of action.
- The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- *Rickey*’s zone-of-danger and physical-manifestation requirements are designed to limit bystander NIED recovery and do not govern NIED claims by direct victims of negligent conduct.
- A direct victim may recover for negligently caused emotional distress without pleading physical impact or exposure to physical danger, so long as duty, breach, causation, and compensable harm are adequately alleged and proven.
- In professional negligence involving psychological treatment, emotional harm is a foreseeable type of injury; traditional negligence elements supply the primary limits on liability.
- A professional-licensing statute will not be read to imply a private civil cause of action where the statute provides administrative and criminal enforcement mechanisms and lacks indicia of legislative intent to create private liability.

## Conclusion

The court allowed Corgan’s direct-victim NIED claims to proceed without *Rickey*’s bystander limitations, but rejected an implied private civil remedy under the Psychologist Registration Act, leaving enforcement of licensing violations to the statute’s specified mechanisms.


Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602 (Ill. 1991)