## Facts

- Mary Jo Hebert executed a durable power of attorney in December 2003 appointing her daughter, Sherri Corum, as agent with authority over Mary’s medical and financial affairs.
- In March 2006, Mary was admitted to a nursing-home facility operated by defendants.
- Mary’s husband, Edward Hebert, arranged the admission and signed the facility’s admission agreement containing a mandatory arbitration clause.
- At the time of signing, Edward had no written authority (no power of attorney, guardianship, or similar designation) to act for Mary.
- The statutory scheme governing surrogate health-care decision-making required (i) a capacity determination consistent with statutory procedures and (ii) if an agent with express health-care authority existed, a showing of that agent’s approval or unavailability before a surrogate could act.
- The record did not show compliance with these statutory prerequisites when Edward signed the admission agreement.
- Mary later died; Corum, as personal representative, filed a wrongful-death action alleging negligence and related claims.

## Issues

1. Whether defendants established statutory prerequisites for Edward to act as Mary’s surrogate decision-maker under the New Mexico Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act (including a capacity determination and the agent’s approval or unavailability).
2. Whether, if a valid surrogate existed, agreeing to an arbitration clause in an admission agreement is a permissible “health-care decision” under the statute.
3. Whether refusing to enforce the arbitration clause applied arbitration-specific “special scrutiny” inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to stay and compel arbitration.
- The court held defendants failed to show the statutory conditions precedent for surrogate decision-making were met; therefore Edward lacked authority to bind Mary to the admission agreement’s arbitration clause.
- Because surrogate authority was not established, the court did not decide whether agreeing to arbitration is a “health-care decision” under the statute.
- The court rejected the argument that the ruling violated the FAA, reasoning the analysis rested on neutral contract-formation and statutory authority principles rather than disfavor of arbitration.

## Legal Principles

- Statutory surrogate authority to make health-care decisions arises only after required capacity findings are made according to the governing statute.
- When a principal has an agent with express health-care authority, a surrogate may act only upon a showing that the agent approved the decision or was not reasonably available.
- An arbitration agreement is enforceable only if formed by a person with authority to contract for the principal; lack of authority defeats enforcement without implicating arbitration-specific rules.
- The FAA’s equal-treatment rule is satisfied when a court evaluates arbitration clauses under generally applicable contract and agency principles.

## Conclusion

The court enforced the statutory limits on surrogate decision-making and held that, absent proof of required capacity determinations and the availability/approval status of the resident’s designated agent, a spouse who signed a nursing-home admission contract could not bind the resident (or her estate) to arbitrate; denial of arbitration was therefore affirmed.


Corum v. Roswell Senior Living, LLC, 149 N.M. 287, 248 P.3d 329 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010)