## Facts

- A small seasonal inn in Maine was owned by Neal Weinstein through Coconut Island Corp. and managed by employee Charles Bonney.
- Patricia O’Boyle Costos and a friend stayed at the inn for a weekend in August 1993 and paid Bonney for the room.
- Bonney represented himself as the inn’s manager and carried keys associated with his managerial duties, including access to guest rooms.
- Costos and her friend retired for the night; in the early morning Bonney used a key he possessed through his job to enter Costos’s room and rape her while she slept.
- Costos filed a federal diversity action against the corporate owner and Weinstein asserting negligence and vicarious liability for Bonney’s intentional tort.
- A jury found defendants vicariously liable and awarded $50,000 on that claim, plus $5,000 on negligence.
- Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law on vicarious liability; the district court denied the motion and defendants appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether, under Maine law adopting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d), an employer may be vicariously liable for an employee’s intentional tort committed outside the scope of employment when the employee was aided by the agency relationship.
2. Whether the evidence permitted a reasonable jury to find that the manager’s job-based access (including keys and knowledge of guest room location) materially aided the rape, without requiring proof of apparent authority or deceit.

## Decision

- The First Circuit affirmed the denial of judgment as a matter of law and upheld the jury verdict imposing vicarious liability.
- The court held the case was properly submitted to the jury under Maine law and the record evidence.
- The court rejected defendants’ contention that § 219(2)(d) liability is limited to situations involving apparent authority or deceit.
- The court concluded the evidence supported a finding that Bonney’s managerial role and entrusted access enabled him to locate Costos’s room and enter it with a key to commit the assault.

## Legal Principles

- Under Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d) as applied in Maine, an employer may be liable for an employee’s tort outside the scope of employment if the employee was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relationship.
- “Aided by the agency relation” may be satisfied where employment-based authority or access materially assists the tort (e.g., possession of keys and room information entrusted to a manager).
- On review of a denial of judgment as a matter of law, the appellate court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and asks whether a reasonable jury could find for that party.
- Absent clear state-law limitations, a federal court applying state law will not add extra elements (such as apparent authority or deceit) to restrict § 219(2)(d) liability.

## Conclusion

The First Circuit upheld employer vicarious liability for a manager’s rape of a guest because the manager’s agency status and job-conferred access to keys and guest information could reasonably be found to have materially aided the assault, bringing the case within Restatement § 219(2)(d) under Maine law.


Costos v. Coconut Island Corp., 137 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 1998)