## Facts

- Oregon law, ORS 250.048(9), prohibited a person registered to gather initiative petition signatures for pay from simultaneously gathering signatures on other petitions for which the person was not paid.
- Marquis Couey registered as a paid signature gatherer for certain initiative petitions during the 2010 election cycle.
- Couey wanted to gather signatures for other measures as a volunteer at the same time and sued the Oregon Secretary of State, alleging the restriction violated state and federal free expression and association rights.
- While the case was pending, Couey stopped working as a paid signature collector and his paid-circulator registration expired.
- The Secretary moved for summary judgment, arguing the case was moot because Couey was no longer subject to the restriction.
- Couey submitted an affidavit stating he intended to work again as a paid circulator in the future and might also want to volunteer on other measures simultaneously; he also invoked ORS 14.175, a statute permitting adjudication of certain otherwise-moot cases that are likely to evade judicial review.
- The circuit court dismissed on mootness grounds, reasoning the case was not likely to evade review because Couey had not sought expedited consideration; the Court of Appeals affirmed.

## Issues

1. Whether Couey’s affidavit established a continuing practical effect sufficient to avoid mootness.
2. If the case was moot, whether it was justiciable under ORS 14.175 as a controversy capable of repetition and likely to evade judicial review.
3. Whether the legislature had constitutional authority to enact ORS 14.175 consistent with Oregon justiciability limits and separation-of-powers principles.

## Decision

- The court held Couey’s personal claim was moot because he was no longer registered as a paid signature gatherer and thus was not currently subject to ORS 250.048(9).
- The court held the case was nevertheless justiciable under ORS 14.175 because election-cycle disputes over signature-gathering restrictions are time-limited and often cannot be fully litigated before the challenged circumstances end, and Couey showed a reasonable expectation of recurrence.
- The court upheld ORS 14.175 as within legislative authority and not an impermissible command to issue advisory opinions.
- The Oregon Court of Appeals decision and the circuit court judgment were reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings on the merits of the constitutional challenge to ORS 250.048(9).

## Legal Principles

- Under Oregon justiciability doctrine, a case is moot when a judicial decision will no longer have a practical effect on the parties’ rights.
- ORS 14.175 permits adjudication despite mootness when the controversy is capable of repetition, likely to evade judicial review due to short duration, and remains an adversarial dispute rather than a hypothetical question.
- Election-law controversies arising from fixed election-cycle deadlines can satisfy the “likely to evade review” requirement.
- The legislature may authorize courts to decide certain otherwise-moot controversies so long as the dispute remains within the judicial power and the statute does not require abstract advisory opinions.

## Conclusion

The Oregon Supreme Court ruled that although Couey was no longer personally subject to the challenged restriction and his claim was moot, the dispute qualified for adjudication under ORS 14.175, and the statute authorizing such review was constitutional; the dismissal was reversed and the case returned to the trial court for merits litigation.


Couey v. Atkins, 357 Or. 460, 355 P.3d 866 (Or. 2015)