## Facts

- Paul J. Smith sued Nicholas Coulas and William J. Bray, Jr. for amounts allegedly due on an open account and a promissory note.
- Bray denied liability and filed a cross-claim against Coulas seeking indemnity for any amounts Smith might recover and attorney’s fees.
- Coulas answered Smith’s complaint, answered Bray’s cross-claim, and counterclaimed against Smith for $18,000; Smith replied to the counterclaim.
- The court initially set trial for October 10, 1958, with notice sent by the clerk to counsel.
- Counsel for Smith and Bray later stipulated to continue the trial to December 10, 1958; the court reset the trial and the record reflected that the clerk notified all counsel of the new date.
- Coulas’s counsel did not participate in the stipulation, and Coulas and his counsel later asserted they did not receive notice of the new trial setting.
- On December 10, 1958, Coulas did not appear; a jury was impaneled, evidence was presented by Smith and Bray, and judgment was entered against Coulas on Smith’s claims and in favor of Bray against Coulas on Bray’s cross-claim.
- Nearly two years later, Coulas moved to vacate the judgment as void, arguing lack of notice of the rescheduled trial date and lack of three days’ notice for a default judgment; the trial court denied the motion.

## Issues

1. Whether the judgment entered after Coulas failed to appear for trial was a “default judgment” requiring three days’ written notice under Arizona Rule 55(b).
2. Whether the judgment was void or otherwise subject to being vacated because Coulas claimed he did not receive notice of the rescheduled trial date.
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Coulas’s motion to vacate the judgment.

## Decision

- The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the order denying Coulas’s motion to vacate.
- The court held the December 10 judgment was not a Rule 55 default judgment because the case was at issue after Coulas filed responsive pleadings, including a counterclaim.
- Because the judgment followed a trial at which evidence was taken, Rule 55(b)’s three-day notice requirement for an application for default judgment did not apply.
- The court relied on the record stating that counsel were notified of the new trial date and applied the presumption that court officials properly performed their duties.
- The court found no abuse of discretion in denying relief, emphasizing Coulas’s substantial delay in seeking to set the judgment aside.

## Legal Principles

- Once a defendant answers on the merits and the case is at issue, a default judgment under Rule 55 is not available; if the defendant later fails to appear for trial, judgment may be entered on the merits upon proof.
- Rule 55(b)’s notice requirement applies to applications for default judgment, not to judgments entered after a trial proceeding in the defendant’s absence when the pleadings have joined issue.
- Courts presume that official duties, including clerk notification of trial settings reflected in the record, were properly performed absent a sufficient showing to rebut that presumption.
- Motions to vacate a judgment are committed to the trial court’s discretion; an appellate court will not reverse absent a clear abuse, and significant delay in seeking relief weighs against the movant.

## Conclusion

The court upheld a judgment entered after a defendant’s nonappearance at a rescheduled trial, ruling that where the defendant has answered and the case is at issue, the resulting judgment is on the merits rather than a default judgment and Rule 55(b) notice is not required; the trial court acted within its discretion in denying belated relief.


Coulas v. Smith, 96 Ariz. 325, 395 P.2d 527 (Ariz. 1964)