## Facts

- A minor bicyclist, Bobby Thomas Courtless, was struck by a vehicle driven by David Clyde Jolliffe and suffered permanent injuries resulting in paraplegia.
- At the time of the collision, Jolliffe was employed by Princess Beverly Coal Company and was traveling from home to a mine site for work.
- During the commute, Jolliffe stopped to purchase shock absorbers for the truck he was driving.
- The truck was owned by Jolliffe, but Princess paid the truck’s monthly payment, paid maintenance and repair expenses, and provided gasoline from company tanks.
- In exchange for these payments and benefits, Jolliffe used the truck daily at Princess work sites.
- Princess ultimately paid for the shock absorbers Jolliffe purchased on the way to work.
- The injured minor’s guardian sued Jolliffe for negligence and sued Princess under respondeat superior, alleging Jolliffe acted within the scope of employment.
- The trial court stayed further discovery as to Princess pending Jolliffe’s deposition and later granted Princess summary judgment, finding the “coming and going” rule barred vicarious liability and no exception applied.

## Issues

1. Whether disputed material facts existed as to whether Jolliffe was acting within the scope of employment, including whether an exception to the coming-and-going rule applied, so that Princess could be vicariously liable.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by staying discovery and then granting summary judgment before discovery on material scope-of-employment facts was completed.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the grant of summary judgment to Princess and remanded.
- The court held there was a genuine issue of material fact on whether Jolliffe’s travel and the stop to purchase employer-paid vehicle parts were sufficiently connected to Princess’s business to fall within scope of employment or an exception to the coming-and-going rule.
- The court further held the discovery stay, followed by summary judgment, improperly prevented development of evidence on material issues.

## Legal Principles

- Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; reasonable inferences must be drawn for the nonmovant.
- Under respondeat superior, an employee’s conduct may be within the scope of employment when it is specifically or impliedly directed by the employer, or is an ordinary and natural incident of such directed conduct.
- The coming-and-going rule generally bars employer liability for employee negligence while commuting, but exceptions may apply when the travel or a component of the trip serves the employer’s business.
- When evidence supports competing inferences on scope of employment, the issue is for the factfinder rather than disposition on summary judgment.
- Restricting discovery on material facts and then resolving those facts at summary judgment can constitute an abuse of discretion.

## Conclusion

The court held that evidence of the employer’s substantial financial support and daily business use of the employee’s vehicle, along with employer payment for the parts purchased during the commute, created a triable question on scope of employment notwithstanding the coming-and-going rule, and that summary judgment entered after limiting discovery was improper.


Courtless v. Jolliffe, 507 S.E.2d 136 (W. Va. 1998)