## Facts

- The case involved private nuisance claims concerning noise from a motor racing stadium and motor-cross track, for which planning permissions had been granted in 1975 and 1992.
- The claimant moved into a cottage near these facilities in 2006 and sued, arguing the noise constituted an actionable nuisance.
- The High Court issued an injunction, but the Court of Appeal overturned this on the basis that planning permission made the noise lawful.
- The Supreme Court reviewed whether obtaining planning permission or the claimant’s knowledge of the existing activities affected the nuisance claim.
- The judgment also referenced the role of planning authorities and the ability of courts to distinguish between regulatory approval and private rights under common law.

## Issues

1. Whether planning permission for noisy activities constituted a defence to a private nuisance claim.
2. To what extent the terms of planning permission are relevant in assessing the reasonableness of a landowner’s use.
3. Whether “coming to the nuisance” (i.e., claimants moving into an area with existing activity) provides a valid defence against nuisance.
4. What principles should guide the granting of remedies, particularly injunctions versus damages, in nuisance cases.
5. Whether public interest and business considerations should influence the choice of remedy in nuisance cases.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court held that planning permission does not provide a defence to a nuisance claim; common law rights to quiet enjoyment operate independently from planning regulation.
- The terms of granted planning permission may be relevant when assessing reasonableness but do not equate to a right to cause a nuisance.
- “Coming to the nuisance” was rejected as a defence; claimants remain entitled to protection regardless of their arrival after the commencement of the activity.
- The court clarified that injunctions are not automatic in nuisance cases; damages may be awarded in lieu, depending on the circumstances and various factors.
- The judgment moved away from the rigidity of _Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co_, stating that its considerations are relevant but not determinative.
- The court acknowledged public benefit and planning permissions as relevant but not decisive factors in fashioning remedies.

## Legal Principles

- Planning permission regulates use of land but does not legalise acts that are otherwise a nuisance at common law.
- The reasonableness of a defendant’s conduct is assessed with reference to the character of the locality, the terms of planning permission, and the actual facts of the interference.
- The doctrine of “coming to the nuisance” does not bar a claimant from relief.
- Courts have flexibility to award damages in lieu of injunctions, considering severity, duration, impact, and public benefit.
- Public interest, including economic and social factors, may be relevant to the remedy chosen but does not automatically outweigh private rights.
- The liability of landlords for their tenants’ nuisance (as further discussed in _Coventry v Lawrence (No 2)_) arises only if landlords authorised or participated in the nuisance.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court established that planning permission does not exempt landowners from nuisance claims and that claimants retain rights to quiet enjoyment regardless of the timing of their arrival. While planning terms and public interest are relevant factors in determining remedies, they do not override the fundamental common law protections against unreasonable interference. The court endorsed a flexible, fact-based approach to both liability and remedies, moving away from rigid historical rules.


Coventry v Lawrence (No 1) [2014] UKSC 13